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The Right to Privacy & Assisted
Reproductive Technologies:
A Comparative Study of the Law of
Germany and the U.S.
Andreas S. Voss
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Law & Medicine
The law is not static; America's most famous judge, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., has pointed out that the law "cannot be dealt with as if it con-
tained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics."' Political,
social, economic, and scientific changes happen continually, which in return
demand the law's reaction. Thus, if "we try to specify a particularized right in
some localized area, we discover that we have committed ourselves to a
description of an entire social order."
2
For example, the development of the right to privacy, which was to a
great extent triggered by a law review article written by Samuel D. Warren
and Louis D. Brandeis,3 was a reaction to new technologies developing in
1890: the telegraph, tabloid newspapers, the high-speed printing press, and the
telephone. 4 "Recent inventions and business methods," Warren and Brandeis
wrote, "call attention to the next step which must be taken for the protection of
the person. [Numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the predic-
tion that what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-
tops]."5 Similarly, the German right to privacy has been developed in reaction
to the growth of the mass media - the press, television and radio
broadcasting.
6
An area in which the unique relationship between law and natural sci-
ences becomes most obvious is the field of medicine. Developments in this
area are often meteoric; medical technology develops "so rapidly and perva-
sively that it risks overwhelming individuality. ' '7 "What once was solely
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1, Little Brown and Company, Boston,
(1881) (cited in Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387 (Del, 1995)).
2. Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363, 1379 (1984).
3. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193
(1890).
4. ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, THE LAW OF PRIVACY IN A NUTSHELL 8 (1993).
5. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 195.
6. See KARL LARENZ, LEHRBUCH DES SCHULDRECHTS, ZwEITER BAND 471-72 (10th ed.
1972); HEIN KOETZ, DELIKTSRECHT 273 (2nd ed. 1979).
7. Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and American
Constitutional Law, 1997 Utah L. Rev. 963, 965 (1997).
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within the realm of science fiction is now within the realm of reality. The
field of biotechnology is rapidly producing questions the legal community has
never before been called upon to answer."8 The Nobel prize laureate Kary
Mullis, who was the American researcher responsible for the technique per-
mitting rapid replication of multiple copies of DNA which inspired the movie
"Jurassic Park," noted this issue recently when she said that "anything that
human beings can imagine is possible." 9
Taking a more pessimistic view, Ellis Huber, the President of the German
Chamber of Physicians ("Bundesaerztekammer") in Berlin, said, "Doctors to-
day often can do more than people want or need for their happiness." 10 Others
have pointed out that further developments in the area of genetic engineering
and advances in medical technology may bring us closer to Huxley's Brave
New World, closer than many of us would desire.11 As with all scientific
discoveries, the results can be used well or poorly.1 2 Therefore, it is vital the
law is able to keep pace with science.13
B. Law & Assisted Reproductive Technologies
Perhaps the biggest challenge the law faces at the beginning of the new
millennium is how to respond adequately to the development in the area of
assisted reproduction. 14 Today, the birth of a child is no longer considered an
inevitable act of nature or an intimate, sacred act by which people create a
family,15 but as a "perfectly plannable enterprise." 16 The rapid expansion of
reproductive technologies since the late 1970's accelerated the transformation
of the family by undermining "sacred assumptions" about the reproductive
process,17 and simultaneously disrupted familiar social and biological an-
chors. 18 In 1996, nearly 65,000 assisted reproductive technology (ATR) treat-
8. Elizabeth Ann Pitrolo, The Birds, the Bees, and the Deep Freeze: Is there International
Consensus in the Debate over Assisted Reproductive Technologies?, 19 Hous. J. Int'l L. 147,
148 (1996).
9. "Back to the Future" More likely than "Jurassic Park", Chemist Says, Rocky Moun-
tains News, Dec.5, 1993, at A84.
10. See Stem, August 8, 1996, at A87.
11. See Herbert Harrer, Aspects of Failed Family Planning in the United States of America
and Germany, 15 J. Legal Med. 89, 127 (1994); John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and
Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 942, 951
(1986); John A. Robertson, Liberty, Identity, and Human Cloning, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1371, 1384,
1387 (1998).
12. Pitrolo, supra note 8, at 205.
13. See Eberle, supra note 7, at 1001; see also BGH, NJW 1966, 2353 (2354) ("The law
must not capitulate to technological development.").
14. See Robertson, supra note 11. Especially when combined with cloning.
15. See Gregory A. Triber, Growing Pains: Disputes Surrounding Human Reproductive
Interests Stretch the Boundaries of Traditional Legal Concepts, 23 Seton Hall Legis. J. 103, 106
(1998).
16. Harrer, supra note 11, at 89.
17. Janet L. Dolgin, An Emerging Consensus: Reproductive Technology and the Law, 23
Vt. L. Rev. 225 (1998).
18. Id. at 229; see also Triber, supra note 15.
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ment cycles were carried out at about 300 programs in the United States.' 9
According to an article in the July 1998 issue of Science Magazine, about
60,000 babies a year are now born in the United States as a result of artificial
insemination, another 15,000 from in-vitro-fertilization, and at least 1,000 due
to surrogacy arrangements. 20 It is estimated that another 30,000 embryos are
currently in storage.2' The U.S. infertility industry grosses approximately $2
billion annually.22 In Germany, approximately 3,500 children are born each
year as a result of reproductive techniques; 23 IVF has been used approximately
15,000 times in 1995,24 and upwards of 20,000 embryos are frozen throughout
Europe.
2 5
The importance of these figures becomes obvious when one considers
that in 1983 "more than one in eight American married couples failed to con-
ceive after one year of trying.'' 26 It has recently been estimated that 5.4 mil-
lion infertile couples are living in the United States. 27 According to recent
studies, the year 2050 might mark the end of natural procreation. 28 Due to this
prophecy and the increasing infertility of men around the globe,29 the organi-
zation World Wide Fund of Nature considered proclaiming the year 1996 as
the "Year of the Sperm.
' 30
An assisted reproductive method like in-vitro fertilization, which was
successfully performed as early as 1978 by the British doctors Robert Edwards
19. See Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An Inaliena-
ble Rights Approach to Frozen Embryos Disputes, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 55, 58 (1999); see also
Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity, and the Constitution: The Case for Opening
Closed Records, 2 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 150, 188 (1999); Pitrolo, supra note 8, at 149; Robertson,
supra note 11, at 943; George P. Smith, Assisted Noncoital Reproduction: A Comparative Anal-
ysis, 8 B.U. Int'l L. J. 21 (1990); Rebecca S. Snyder, Reproductive Technology and Stolen Ova:
Who is the Mother? 16 Law & Ineq. J. 289, n.8-14 (1998); Triber, supra note 15, at 106 n.15.
20. ISLAT Working Group, ART into Science: Regulation of Fertility Techniques, 281 Sci-
ence July 31, 1998, at 651; see also Coleman, supra note 19, at 56; Snyder, supra note 19, n.44.
21. Heidi Forster, The Legal and Ethical Debate Surrounding the Storage and Destruction
of Frozen Human Embryos: A Reaction to the Mass Disposal in Britain and the Lack of Law in
the United States, 76 Wash. U. L. Q. 759, 763 (1998).
22. See Goffrey Cowley, Ethics and Embryos, Newsweek, June 12, 1995, at A 67. Payment
for sperm and eggs is widespread among American infertility clinics; sperm donors typically
receive $50, and egg donors receive $2,000, per donation; See Ann Alpers & Bernard Lo,
Commodification and Commercialization in Human Embryo Research, 6 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev.
39, 41 (1995); Christine L. Feiler, Human Embryo Experimentation: Regulation and Relative
Rights, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 2435, 2455 (1998).
23. See Voss, VERNICHTUNG TIEFGERFORENEN SPERMAS ALS KOERPERVERLETZUNG?, DE-
LIKTSRECHTLICHE PROBLEM4E AUSGELAGERTER KOERPERSUBSTANZEN DES MENSCHEN 4 n.23
(1997).
24. Id.
25. Smith, supra note 19, at 23.
26. See Robertson, supra note 11, at 944.
27. Snyder, supra note 19, n.10.
28. See VOSS, supra note 23, at 4 n.22.
29. The reasons for the high level of modern infertility consist of environmental and social
factors, See, Triber, supra note 15, at 106, n.14; Robertson, supra note 11, at 945-46.
30. See Spiegel, Nur noch halbe Maenner, February 26, 1996, at A230.
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and Patrick Steptoe,31 rapidly spread throughout the United States, Canada,
Europe and Australia shortly thereafter. 32 This method even produced chil-
dren in countries like China where population control is a top state priority and
where population reduction policies are strictly enforced. 33 Yet it may already
be regarded as outdated today.
A more recent high-tech fertilization method, called intracytoplasmic
sperm injection, developed by the Belgian gynecologist Prof. Andre van
Steirteghem and the Vietnamese physician Dr. Ng,3 4 apparently is able to
achieve much better results. This method entails injecting a single sperm cell
- for traditional fertilization methods, 50,000 to 100,000 sperm cells are
needed - with an extremely thin glass needle directly into the woman's egg
cell, thus enabling conception even in cases of low sperm count or impaired
motility.35 Gynecologists hope first, that they can help nine out of ten of those
men who were previously infertile, and second, that the rate of malformation
is not higher than the rate in traditional fertilization treatment.
36
One thing is certain: this will not be the last innovation in the field of
assisted reproductive medicine. After it has become possible to separate re-
production from sexuality and to distribute the tasks of biological maternity
among several women within a very short period of time, 37 even more revolu-
tionary developments - such as, the creation of an artificial uterus, 38 the
complete extracorporeal gestation of human beings, 39 or even male preg-
nancy 40 - will challenge the societal and legal systems within the next de-
cades. Thus, reproductive technology will remain "an area where the facts are
still in flux and where the values are as yet uncertain, manifesting no clear
social consensus."
4'
C. Scope of This Aticle
This article compares the development of the right to privacy and its po-
tential to solve new problems caused by modem assisted reproductive technol-
ogies in the law of the United States and Germany. As a threshold, it is
convenient to first examine how the terms "privacy" or "personality" 42 are
defined in both countries, to ensure that one discusses essentially the same
31. See Feiler, supra note 22, at 2436; Robertson, supra note 11, at 943.
32. Robertson, supra note 11, at 943.
33. Pitrolo, supra note 8, at 149-50.
34. See Adolf Laufs, Arzt und Recht im Umbruch der Zeit, NJW 1995, 1590 (1593) n.74.
35. See Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive Technology,
45 UCLA L. Rev. 1077, 1081 n.12 (1998).
36. Voss, supra note 23, at 3 n.10.
37. Dolgin, supra note 17, at 280.
38. See Hirsch, Die kuenstliche Befruchtung - vom rechtsfreien Raum ueber das
Standesrecht zum Gesetz, Festschrift fuer Walter Weissauer zum 65. Geburtstag 37, 63 (1986).
39. See Robertson, supra note 11, at 1032.
40. See Pitrolo, supra note 8, at 158.
41. Rao, supra note 35, at 1122.
42. Both terms will be used synonymously.
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thing. Thereafter, it is necessary to show the origins of the right and its inter-
pretation by the highest courts of both jurisdictions. One can then discuss to
what extent the right to privacy is a suitable concept in the area of reproduc-
tive health law, focusing on the right to procreate, the right of informational
self-determination, the right to know one's heritage, and the right to enter into
surrogacy contracts and their interdependence in this context. The article con-
cludes with a critical comparison, and most importantly, an analysis of the
question of what the United States and Germany can learn from each other.
Note, the article will encompass the right to privacy in its constitutional con-
text as well as under tort law.
Both in Germany and the U.S., the fundamental rights provisions found
in the Constitution and Bill of Rights respectively perform the traditional de-
fensive or negative function of protecting the individual against interference
by the state. The German provisions, however, have sometimes been held to
have a positive dimension as well, i.e. they impose various affirmative duties
on the state to protect one citizen against another and even occasionally to
overcome organizational, technical, or financial obstacles to the exercise of a
fundamental right.43 For example, the Constitutional Court has held that con-
stitutional provisions protecting human dignity44 and the right to life45 re-
quirethe legislature to make abortions a crime in most instances. 46 Similarly,
the guarantee of broadcasting freedom in Art. 5 (1),47 has been held to require
the state to establish a legal framework in which all significant interests can
make themselves heard.4 8 In addition, the provision of Art. 7 (4)49 protecting
the right to establish private schools has been found to require in some cases
that they be subsidized by the state. 50 Although affirmative constitutional
rights and duties are not entirely unknown in the U.S., 5 1 the Bill of Rights has
43. See DAVID P. CURRIE, Ti CONSTrrTON OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 13-
14 (1994).
44. Art. 1 (1) states: Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the
duty of all state authority.
45. Art. 2 (2) states: Every person shall have the right to life and physical integrity. Free-
dom of the person shall be inviolable. These rights may be interfered with only pursuant to a
law.
46. See BVerfGE 39, 1.
47. Art. 5 (1) states in relevant part: Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by
means of broadcasts and films shall be guaranteed.
48. See BVerfGE 12, 205.
49. Art. 7 (4) states: The right to establish private schools shall be guaranteed. Private
schools that serve as alternatives to state schools shall require the approval of the federal state
and shall be subject to the laws of the states. Such approval shall be given when private schools
are not inferior to the state schools in terms of their educational aims, their facilities, or the
professional training of their teaching staff, and when segregation of pupils according to the
means of their parents will not be encouraged thereby. Approval shall be withheld if the eco-
nomic and legal position of the teaching staff is not adequately assured.
50. See BVerfGE 75, 40.
51. See, e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
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been held to be basically, as Judge Posner wrote, "... a charter of negative
rather than positive liberties."
' 52
On the other hand, the law of torts focuses in both countries on the rela-
tionship between individuals among each other. Thus, the acknowledgement
of a constitutional right to privacy does not necessarily predetermine the exis-
tence of a (private) right to privacy under tort principles. As will be discussed
in more detail later,53 the German Supreme Court has developed a "general
right to personality" under tort law with explicit reference to Art. 1 and Art. 2
(1)
54 of the German Constitution. 55 Hence, it seemed vital to discuss the right
to privacy in a broad sense and to examine constitutional as well as tort cases.
Important distinctions will be pointed out whenever necessary.
H. PRIVACY DEFINED
A. Germany
In Germany, the general right to privacy is traditionally defined as the
"right of the individual to have his dignity respected and to develop his indi-
vidual personality. ' 56 Gierke defined personality as "the right to be valid as a
person," 57 and Kohler called privacy "the right to claim that a person is ac-
knowledged as a valid moral and intellectual personality. '58 According to
Michaelis, privacy is the "right to freely unfold one's power." 59 Moreover,
Smoschewer called privacy the "epitome of all values which are not measura-
ble in terms of money,"'60 and Erdsiek spoke of the protection of "those non-
material values which remain when we disregard one's material assets. '61
The most elaborate definition of privacy, however, was offered by
Hubmann in his book The Right to Privacy.62 Hubmann defines personality as
52. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7d' Circ. 1983); see also DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 316 (1980).
53. See infra text accompanying notes 80-123.
54. Art. 2 (1) states: Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality
insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the
moral law.
55. As LARENZ, supra note 6, at Sec. 72 HI, points out, it is not entirely clear whether the
Supreme Court applied Art. 1 and 2 (1) directly, regarding both rights as identical, or whether it
viewed the constitutional provisions as establishing a right for the court to fill gaps in the Civil
Code.
56. BGHZ 24, 72 (76); 27, 284 (285-86); NJW 1959, 525.
57. OTTo VON GIERKE, DEUTSCHES PRIVATRECHT, ERSTER BAND 703 (1895).
58. JOSEF KOHLER IN JOSEF KOHLER (PUBLISHER), ENZYKLOPAEDIE DER RECHTSWISSEN-
SCHAFT, ERSTER BAND 587 (1904).
59. MICHAELIS, PERSOENLICHKETSRECHTLICHE BEFUGNISSE IM DEurTSCHEN URHEBERRECHT
34 (1926).
60. Fritz Smoschewer, Das Persoenlichkeitsrecht im allgemeinen und im Urheberrecht,
Ufita 3 (1930), 119 (136).
61. Gerhard Erdsiek, Der Regierungsentwurf zum Persoenlichkeits- und Ehrenschutzgesetz,
Ufita 29 (1959), 1 (9).
62. HEINRICH HUBMANN, DAS PERSOENLICHKEITSRECHT (1953).
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[t]he own performance, constant creativity; it is the human
person on its way to maturity . . . . It covers those valuable
personal interests which have not been made independent
rights by the law. The right to privacy protects all values and
goods, the inner as well as the outer ones, the spiritual as well
as the physical ones, and protects not only the outer, physical
existence, but also his mental powers, his spirit, will and
feelings.
63
However, Hubmann himself has admitted that although probably everyone has
some "dark imagination" of privacy, the attempt of an exact and complete
analysis would lead to the point where this imagination would "melt away like
mist;" the nature of personality would be "wrapped in a veil," surrounded by a
"deep darkness," the "secret of mankind."
64
B. United States
According to a recent comment, American law has never really sought to
define human personhood or personality.65 There are, however, the following
statements, which give the right to privacy some contours: 66 In their famous
law review article "The Right to Privacy' 67 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis defined the right to privacy as the "right to be let alone." 68 In fact,
this was no creation of Warren and Brandeis, but rather a term that they took
from Judge Thomas M. Cooley's definition in his treatise on tort law. 69 Pri-
vacy, they said, could be circumscribed as "the right of one who has remained
a private individual, to prevent his public portraiture. ' 70 Citing a British case
dating to 1769,71 they acknowledged that the common law system would se-
cure each individual "the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his
thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others. ' 72 Pri-
vacy would be "a part of the more general right to the immunity of the person,
the right to one's personality. '73
In his article "Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser," 74 Edward J. Bloustein, citing Judge Andrew J. Cobb,75 wrote,
63. Id. at 60, 136, and 376.
64. Id. at 9, 10, 131-32, 135 and 149.
65. Eberle, supra note 7, at 973.
66. For a more comprehensive overview see SMiTH, supra note 4, at 45-49.
67. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 193.
68. Id. at 195.
69. THOMAS M. COOLEY, ON TORTS (1888).
70. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 213.
71. Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2379 (1769).
72. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 198.
73. Id. at 207.
74. 39 NYU L. Rev. 962 (1964).
75. See Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 122 Ga 190, 195-96, 50 SE. 68, 70
(1905).
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"Each is entitled to a liberty of choice as to his manner of life, and neither an
individual nor the public has a right to arbitrarily take away from him his
liberty."'76 Similarly, Alan F. Westin defined privacy as "[t]he claim of indi-
viduals ... to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent infor-
mation about them is communicated to others . . . ." Privacy is the voluntary
and temporary withdrawal of a person from the general society through physi-
cal and or psychological means .... ,"77 Finally, privacy has been called "the
attempt to control the time and manner of disclosures of personal information
about oneself. ' 78 However, similar to the German situation, the exact mean-
ing of the doctrine of the right to privacy in American law still remains un-
clear. It has been criticized as "exasperatingly vague and evanescent, often
meaning strikingly different things to different people.
79
III. ORIGIN AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A. Germany
1. Reichsgericht/Weimarer Reichsverfassung: No (Express) Right to
Privacy
While the legal systems that existed in Germany in the nineteenth century
provided an extensive protection of the right to privacy, 80 the drafters of the
German Civil Code ultimately decided - ignoring the criticism of well
known scholars8' and in contrast to the laws of other European countries 82 and
76. 39 NYU L. Rev. 962, 1002 (1964).
77. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
78. SMITH, supra note 4, at 45.
79. ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY (Univ. of Mich. Press 1971) (cited in
SMITH, supra note 4, at 45 n.l15).
80. The Civil Code of Saxony of 1863 gave judges the discretion to award damages in cases
involving the "dissemination of untrue statements about a person's life, personal abilities, con-
duct of office, established business, or other relations." B.S. MARKESINIS, THE GERMAN LAW
OF TORTS 63 (3' ed. 1994). Similar provisions existed in Preuseen; See Preussisches ALR I 6
sec. 10 et. seq., and in those German areas (on the left side of the Rhine river) in which the
French Code Civil was applicable; DIETER LEUZE, DIE ENTWICKLUNG DES PERSOENLICHKE1T-
SRECHTS IM 19. JAHRHUNDERT (1962); ERNST RABEL, GESAMMELTE AUFSAETZE, BAND III 103
(1919-1954); Robert Scheyhing, Zur Geschichte des Persoenlichkeitsrechts im 19. Jahrhundert,
AcP 158 (1959/1960), 503; KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOETZ, EINFUEHRUNG IN DIE RECHT-
SVERGLEICHUNG AUF DEM GEBIETE DES PRIVATRECHTS, BAND 2 Sec. 17 11 (1984).
81. Distinguished scholars like J. Kohler (Das Recht an Briefen, ArchBuergR 7 (1893), 94,
101) and the famous "Germanist" Oro VON GIERKE (DEUTSCHES PRIVATRECHT, ERSTER BAND
(1895), SEC. 81; DRrrTER BAND (1917), Sec. 211 11) attempted to establish a general right to
privacy towards the end of the 19" century; see also FRANZ VON LISZT, DIE DELIKTSOBLIGA-
TIONEN IM SYSTEM DES BUERGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHS 3, 20 (1898); REICHSJUSTIZAMT (PUB-
LISHER), ZUSAMIMENSTELLUNG DER GUTACHTER-LICHEN AEUSSERUNGEN ZU DEM ENTWURF
EINEs BUERGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHS, BAND IH 398 (1890).
82. See Swiss Obligationenrecht Art. 28 Swiss ZGB and Art. 41 (1); Austrian ABGB Sec.
1295 (I); Art. 2043 code civil Italiano; Art. 914 Greek ZGB; and the French Code Civil Arts.
1382 and 1383; (A similar provision contained Sec. 330 ZGB of the German Democratic
Republic).
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the first draft of the Civil Code83 - not to include an explicit catch-all clause
stating that all violations of the right to privacy should lead to compensatory
damages. The Committee entrusted with the task of drafting the Code rea-
soned that:
[it] (would be) repugnant to the dominant opinion among the
population to place non-material values on the same level as
property interests and to compensate with money interferes
with non-material interests. The Code should not ignore this
view, especially prevalent among the better circles of society.
Only the worst elements (of society) would try to take advan-
tage. Pursuit of profit, selfishness, and covetousness would be
promoted and wrongful proceedings, started from ulterior mo-
tives, would be encouraged.
84
In other words, the legal idea was that "anyone who would sell his honor for
money had no honor.
''85
Making its judgments under the Weimarer Reichsverfassung, the
Reichgericht, did not overstep the restrictions placed upon it, but emphasized
in its decisions that a general right to privacy would be alien to the Civil Code
and result in insolvable problems in delimiting actionable wrong from legal
behavior. 86 More and more, however, the Reichsgericht broadened existing
provisions protecting special areas of freedom. For example, it applied, by
analogy, Sec. 862, 1004 Civil Code 87 to privacy rights. 88 Furthermore, it be-
gan to interpret the terms "willfully" and "public policy" in Sec. 826 BGB 89 in
83. E I Sec. 704. See MOTIVE ZU DEM ENTWURF EINES BUERGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHS FUER
DAS DEUTSCHE REICH, BAND II 724 et seq. (1888); B. MUGDAN, DIE GESAMMELTEN MATERI-
ALIEN ZUM BUERGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH FUER DAS DEUTSCHE REICH, II. BAND 404-405, 1267
(1899).
84. See PROTOKILLE DER KOMMISSION FUER DIE ZWEOTE LESUNG DES ENTWURFS DES Bu-
ERGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHS, BAND I 622-23 (1897).
85. Harry D. Krause, The Right to Privacy in Germany - Pointers for American Legisla-
tion?, 1965 Duke L.J. 481, 511.
86. See RGZ 69, 401 (403-404); 113, 413 (414-15).
87. Sec. 862 Civil Code states: (1) If the possessor is disturbed in possession by unlawful
interference, he may demand from the disturber the cessation of the disturbance. If further dis-
turbances are apprehended, the possessor may seek an injunction. (2) The claim is excluded, if
the possession of the possessor is defective relative to the disturber of his legal predecessor and
the possession has been obtained within the year preceding the disturbance. Sec. 1004 Civil
Code states: (1) If the ownership is interfered with otherwise than by dispossession or withhold-
ing of possession, the owner may demand from the disturber the removal of the interference. If
further interference is to be apprehended, the owner may sue for an injunction. (2) The claim is
excluded, if the owner is obliged to tolerate the interference.
88. RGZ 60, 6 (7).
89. Sec. 826 Civil Code states: A person who willfully causes damage to another in a man-
ner contrary to public policy is bound to compensate the other for damage.
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an extensive way. 90 Additionally, it applied Sec. 22 et seq. Kun-
sturhebergesetz (Act on Artistic Creations)
9" with "great ingenuity. 92
2. "Schachtbrief'
93
The first time a general right to privacy was acknowledged was in 1954.
The German Supreme Court had to decide the following case: The defendant
company had published in its weekly journal an article with the title "Dr.
Schacht & Co." and the sub-title "Political considerations concerning the foun-
dation of a new bank." The article contained a comment concerning the new
Bank for Foreign Trade founded by Dr. Schacht, a former secretary of com-
merce under Hitler, and expressed in opposition to Dr. Schacht's political ac-
tivity during the national-socialist regime and the years after the war. On the
instructions of Dr. Schacht who was the plaintiff and an attorney, sent the
defendant a letter in which he said that he would represent Dr. Schacht's inter-
ests, that certain statements in the abovementioned article were incorrect, and
that he asked the defendant to correct the article. In addition, the plaintiff
asked the defendant to inform him of the unrestricted execution of the required
correction by the end of the week, otherwise legal proceedings would be
taken. The defendant, instead of answering the plaintiff's request, published
the letter in the following week's issue of the Journal, along with various opin-
ions by readers of the article, under the heading "Letters from Readers." The
plaintiff argued that such a kind of publication would constitute an injury to
his right to privacy. The publication of the letter, written in his capacity as
attorney for Dr. Schacht, would deliberately misleading as the public. The
incorrect impression would be created that his letter was a mere expression of
opinion by a reader, although the plaintiff had only acted as a lawyer within
the scope of his client's instructions. The defendant, however, argued that it
lay within the publisher's discretion whether and at what place in its journal to
90. RGZ 115, 416 (417-18); 162, 7 (10-12).
91. Sec. 22 KUG ("Right to one's image") states: Pictures or portraits may be distributed or
displayed only with the consent of the person portrayed, i.e., the subject. In cases of doubt,
consent is considered to have been given if the person portrayed has received a consideration for
allowing himself to be portrayed. When the subject dies and for up to 10 years thereafter, the
consent of the next of kin is required. Next of kin within the meaning of this law are the
surviving spouse and children of the subject and, if neither the spouse nor the children are alive,
the parents of the subject. Sec. 23 KUG describes the types of pictures that do not require
consent: (1) The following may be distributed or publicly displayed without the required con-
sent according to Sec. 22: 1. Pictures within the realm of contemporary history; 2. Pictures in
which the persons appear only incidentally in a landscape or other location; 3. Pictures of meet-
ings, receptions, processions and other gatherings in which the persons portrayed have partici-
pated; 4. Pictures that have not been produced by order or request, but whose distribution or
display would be in the higher interests of art. (2) Consent does not, however, extend to distri-
bution and display in which the legitimate interests of the subject or the next of kin are in-
fringed. For a discussion of the KUG see also Bergmann, Publicity Rights in the United States
and in Germany: A Comparative Analysis, 19 Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 479, 501 (1999).
92. See MARsFs.s, supra note 80, at 65 (citing RGZ 69, 401).
93. BGHZ 13, 334. English version in part by F.H. LAWSON and B.S. MARKMSNIS.
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print the communication. The District court found for the plaintiff, but was
reversed by the Court of Appeals, which found "no lawful disparagement" of
the plaintiff.
The German Supreme Court restored the District Court's judgment.94 It
reasoned that the Reichsgericht, although not expressly acknowledging a gen-
eral right to privacy, had already, in many decisions on Sec. 823 Civil Code
95
under the Weimarer Reichsverfassung, approved the protection of certain per-
sonality rights. The Court decided, taking into consideration that on May 23,
1949 the new German Constitution (Grundgesetz) had been put into force,
including the recognition of the right of every human being to have his dignity
respected (Art.1),96 the right to free development of one's personality (Art.
2),97 and the general personality right was to be regarded "as a constitutionally
guaranteed fundamental right."98 The Court went on to hold that by the defen-
dant's electing to publish the plaintiffs request, but omitting essential parts of
the letter, that interests of the plaintiff in the nature of personality rights had
been infringed:
Every verbal expression of a definite thought is an emanation
from the author's personality, even when the protection of
copyright cannot be attributed to its form. It follows that in
principle only the author is entitled to decide whether and in
what form his notes are communicated to the public; for every
publication of the notes of a living person under his name is
rightly regarded by the public as proceeding from a corre-
sponding direction of his will. The nature of the notes and the
method of their communication is subject to the criticism and
valuation of public opinion, which draws conclusions from the
circumstances about the author's personality. While an unau-
thorized publication of private notes constitutes - as a rule
- an inadmissible attack on every human being's protected
sphere of secrecy, a modified reproduction infringes the per-
sonality rights of the author because such unauthorized altera-
tions can spread a false picture of his personality. In general,
not only unauthorized omissions of essential parts of the au-
thor's notes are inadmissible, but also additions through which
notes presented for publication only for certain purposes ac-
94. BGHZ 13, 334 (338).
95. Sec. 823 Civil Code states: (1) A person who, willfully or negligently, unlawfully in-
jures the life, body, health, freedom, property or other right of another is bound to compensate
him for any damage arising therefrom. (2) The same obligation is placed upon a person who
infringes a statute intended for the protection of others. If, according to the provisions of the
statute, an infringement of this is possible even without fault, the duty to make compensation
arises only in the event of fault.
96. See Constitution of Federal Republic of Germany supra, note 44.
97. See id. at Art. 2(1) and 2 (2).
98. BGHZ 13, 334 (338).
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quire a different color or tendency from what he expressed in
the form chosen by him and the kind of publication he had
allowed. 99
From these rules it followed that the defendant would only have been entitled
to either publish the text in complete form, or, restricting itself to the required
correction, to make visible that there had been a demand for correction.
3. "Herrenreiter" 10°
The defendant, a limited partnership, was the manufacturer of a pharma-
ceutical preparation that had the reputation to be able to increase sexual po-
tency. To advertise this preparation in Germany, the defendant disseminated
a poster with the picture of the plaintiff, a competition rider, or show-jumper.
Its source was an original photograph of the plaintiff, which had been taken by
a press agency at a show-jumping competition. The plaintiff had not given
permission for the use of his portrait.
The plaintiff claimed damages from the defendant for the injury he suf-
fered from the dissemination of the poster. The plaintiff argued that the
amount of damages should be a fair sum to be fixed by the court, not falling
short of DM 15,000. The defendant denied any fault and pleaded that, after
touching up, the plaintiff's features were not recognizable in the poster, and
that it had not itself designed or produced the poster but had ordered it from a
respectable, reliable advertising agency. The District Court ordered the de-
fendant to pay DM 1,000, a sum that the Court of Appeals raised to
DM10,000.
The defendant's appeal was unsuccessful.101 Continuing the tradition of
the "Schachtbrief' decision, 0 2 the Supreme Court awarded damages on the
basis of compensation for the non-material injury10 3 which the plaintiff had
suffered as a result of the invasion of his personality. The court explained:
The sacredness of human dignity and the right to free devel-
opment of the personality protected by Art. 1 of the Constitu-
tion are also to be recognized as a civil right to be respected
by everyone in daily life, in so far as that right does not im-
pinge upon the rights of others and is not repugnant to consti-
tutional order or the moral law. This so-called general right to
one's personality also possesses legal validity within the
framework of the civil law and enjoys the protection of Sec.
823 Civil Code under the designation of "other right" . . . .
99. Id. at 338-39.
100. BGHZ 26, 349.
101. Id. at 351.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 93-97.
103. Sec. 253 Civil Code defines a non-material injury as "an injury which is not an injury to
property."
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Articles 1 and 2 of the Constitution protect - and indeed
must be applied by the courts in the administration of justice
- what is called the concept of human personality; they rec-
ognize in it one of the supra-legal basic values of the law.
Thereby they are directly concerned with the protection of the
inner realm of the personality which, in principle, only affords
a basis for the free and responsible self-determination of the
individual and an infringement of which produces primarily
so-called immaterial damage, damage expressed in the degra-
dation of the personality. To respect this inner realm and to
refrain from invading it without authorization is a legal com-
mand issuing from the Basic Law itself. And it follows from
the Constitution that in cases of invasion of this sphere, pro-
tection must be given against damage characteristic of such an
invasion. ' 0 4
Under this reasoning, the Court then extended, by analogy, Sec. 847 Civil
Code,10 5 which allows an equitable compensation in money for non-pecuniary
loss in cases of "deprivation of liberty," traditionally interpreted as covering
only the deprivation of freedom of bodily movement,10 6 to the facts of this
case. It found the Court of Appeal's determination of the sum of DM 10,000
to be an appropriate compensation, especially taking into account the plain-
tiff's social and business position. The court pointed to the fact that the plain-
tiff "moved in a social circle the members of which were for the most part
known to each other and where the risk of making oneself an object to ridicule
was especially great." 10
7
4. "Ginsengwurzel"' 10 8
The plaintiff was a professor in the law faculty of a German university at
which he held a chair of international and ecclesiastical law. From a stay in
Korea he had brought with him a ginseng root, that he placed at the disposal of
his friend Professor H., a pharmacologist, for research. The latter mentioned
in an scientific article on ginseng roots that he had come into possession of
genuine Korean ginseng roots "through the kind assistance" of the plaintiff.
This led to the plaintiff being described in a popular scientific article, which
104. BGHZ 26, 349 (354-55).
105. Sec. 847 states: (1) In the case of injury to the body or health, or in the case of depriva-
tion of liberty, the injured person may also demand fair compensation in money for damage
which is not damage to property. (2) A similar claim belongs to a woman, against whom an
immoral crime or offense is committed, or who is induced by fraud, by threats or by abuse of a
relationship of dependence to permit extra-marital cohabitation.
106. See JULIUS VON STAUDINGER & KARL SCHAEFER, KOMMENTAR ZUM BGB, I. BAND, 5.
TEEL (10th/ilth ed. 1975), Sec. 847 n.12, Sec. 823 n.33.
107. BGHZ 26, 349 (359).
108. BGHZ 35, 363.
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appeared in 1957, along with Professor H. and other scientists, as one of the
best-known ginseng researchers of Europe.
The defendant company dealt in a tonic containing ginseng. In an adver-
tisement for this tonic the plaintiff was referred to as an important scientist
expressing an opinion on its value, and in an editorial note, printed in immedi-
ate connection with an advertisement in another journal, allusion was made to
its use as an aphrodisiac. Both the advertisement and the journal were widely
distributed. The plaintiff claimed that he had suffered an unauthorized attack
on his personality right; and that the advertisement gave rise to the impression
that he had, for payment, issued an opinion on a controversial topic in a de-
partment of knowledge not his own, and unprofessionally lent his name to
advertising a doubtful product. He had suffered damage to his reputation as a
learned man and had been made an object of ridicule to the public and above
all to his students. In reliance on "Herrenreiter", he claimed DM 10,000 as
satisfaction for the harm done to him. The District Court awarded DM 8,000
as damages for pain and suffering. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court held that by invoking the plaintiff's scientific author-
ity in its advertising to encourage belief in the effectiveness of its preparation
for the mentioned purposes, the defendant had unlawfully disparaged his per-
sonality right:
The references to researches by the plaintiff, which lacked any
objective foundation, was in the circumstances calculated to
make him an object of ridicule in society and lessen his schol-
arly reputation. Moreover, he was bound to feel outraged by
the way his name was used in advertising a preparation rec-
ommended as a sexual stimulant .... The Court of Appeals
rightly characterized the defendant's conduct as
irresponsible.10 9
In accordance with the "Schachtbrief' 11 ° and "Herrenreiter"'' judicial
precedents, the Court emphasized that, although Sec. 253 Civil Code states
that money compensation can be claimed for non-pecuniary damage only in
cases expressly designated by the law, this restriction had lost its literal strict-
ness when the new German Constitution was introduced in 1949:
When the Civil Code established that enumeration principle,
the high value of the protection of human personality and its
special sphere had not received the recognition that it enjoys
according to Arts. 1 and 2 (1) of the Constitution. From the
standpoint of the Civil Code, the protection of property inter-
ests always stood in the foreground, whereas the personal
109. BGHZ 365-66.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 93-99.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 102-107.
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worth of a human being received only insufficient and frag-
mentary protection. In recognizing a general personality right
of mankind and granting it the protection of Sec. 823 (1) Civil
Code, the courts drew for civil law purposes the consequences
resulting from the rank the Constitution assigned to the worth
of human personality and the protection of its free develop-
ment. That protection, however, would be incomplete and full
of loopholes if an infringement of the personality right did not
give rise to a sanction adequate to the violation. Just as the
restriction of the protection by the law of tort to specific legal
interests of a human being has proved too narrow to afford the
protection of personality required by the Constitution, so a
narrowing of immaterial damages, for immaterial loss to cover
only injury to specifically mentioned legal interests, no longer
conforms to the value-system of the Constitution .... The
elimination of damages for immaterial loss from the protec-
tion of personality would mean that injury to the dignity and
honor of a human being would remain without any sanction of
the civil law, which deals with the disturbance of essential
values and makes the doer of injury owe satisfaction to the
victim for the wrong done to him. The law would then re-
nounce the strongest and often only instrument calculated to
ensure respect for the personal worth of the individual.'
1 2
However, as one might have expected after "Herrenreiter", this was not
the end of the Court's reasoning. It instead proceeded that it
does not mean that the legal consequences of injuries to body,
health, and freedom on the one hand and the violation of the
personality sphere on the other hand must be exactly the same
or at least largely correspond to each other. A need for differ-
entation is already indicated by the fact that the factual aspect
of an injury to a general personality right is much less specific
than where body, health, or freedom is injured . . . . If for
every overstepping of the limits, however petty, compensation
for immaterial loss were to be awarded to the person affected,
there would be a danger that unimportant injuries would be
used inappropriately to make a gain .... In injuries to the
general personality right the satisfaction function of damages
for pain and suffering advances into the foreground as that of
compensation recedes. Hence it will always be necessary to
look at the kind of injury to the personality right to see if the
person affected, whose injury cannot otherwise be redressed,
112. BGHZ 35, 363 (367-68).
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should be granted satisfaction for the wrong he has suffered.
That will in general only be the case when the doer of damage
is blamed for a serious fault or when an injury to a personality
right is objectively significant.
113
Applying these standards, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals
had been correct in fixing the amount of damages to DM 8,000.114
5. "Soraya''
15
In the famous "Soraya" case, the German Constitutional Court1 16 had to
determine the validity of the approach the Supreme Court had taken. The
tabloid "Das neue Blatt mit Gerichtswoche," published by the Axel Springer
publishing house and famous for its reports on high society members, con-
tained, accompanied by photos, a wholly fictitious interview with the former
wife of the Shah of Iran, Princess Soraya Esfandiary-Bakhtiary. The fictitious
interview, labeled a "special report with exclusive interview" under the head-
ing "[T]he Shah stopped writing me letters," fabricated intimate details of her
former life.
The Princess brought suit, claiming damages for injury to her general
right to privacy. The District Court, under reference to the Supreme Court's
precedents "Leserbrief," "Herrenreiter" and "Ginsengwurzel," ordered the de-
fendant to pay DM 15,000 as damages. The Court of Appeals and the Su-
preme Court affirmed. The defendant brought "Verfassungsbeschwerde"
(complaint of unconstitutionality), claiming a violation of Arts. 2 (1) in con-
nection with Arts. 20 (2), (3), 5 (1), (2), 103 (2) and 3, 12, 14 of the
Constitution.
113. Id. at 368-69.
114. Id. at 370.
115. BVerfGE 34, 269 (1973).
116. The relationship between the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court can be sum-
marized as follows: According to Sec. 13 Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz [GVG] (Act concerning
the constitution of the courts), the ordentlichen Gerichte (courts with general jurisdiction) have
jurisdiction over all civil and criminal suits, except for those which fall under the jurisdiction of
the administrative and other special courts. Similar to the American system, there are trial
courts on the District Court level (called Amtsgerichte [Sec. 23 GVG] and Landgerichte [Sec.
71 GVG]), Courts of Appeal (Landgerichte [Sec. 71 GVG] or Oberlandesgerichte [Sec.119
GVG]) and a Supreme Court (the Bundesgerichtshof [Sec. 133 GVG] in Karlsruhe [Sec. 123
GVG]). In addition, the Constitutional Court, also based in Karlsruhe (Sec. 1 (2) Bundesver-
fassungsgerichtsgesetz [BVerfGG] (Act concerning the constitution of the Constitutional
Court)) has limited jurisdiction according to the catalogue of Art. 93 I of the German Constitu-
tion in conjunction with Sec. 13 BVerfGG. The most relevant fields of jurisdiction are Sec. 13
BVerfGG No.6 (the federal government, a state government or 1/3 of Congress articulates
doubts about the compatibility of a federal or state law with the Constitution), No.11 (a court
expresses doubts about the constitutionality of a law which is essential to decide a pending case)
and No.8a (suit of unconstitutionality by an individual).
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The Constitutional Court found for the plaintiff, explicitly affirming the
constitutionality of the Supreme Court's implementation of constitutional val-
ues in the Civil Code:
I" 7
The personality and dignity of an individual, to be freely en-
joyed and developed within a societal and communal frame-
work, stand at the very center of the value order reflected in
the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution. Thus, an
individual's interest in his personality and dignity must be
respected, and must be protected by all organs of the state (see
Arts. I and 2 of the Constitution). Such protection should be
extended, above all, to a person's private sphere, i.e., the
sphere in which he desires to be left alone, to make . . . his
own decisions, and to remain free from any outside interfer-
ence. Within the area of private law such protection is pro-
vided . . . by the legal rules relating to the general rules
relating to the general right of privacy.
118
What made the decision so remarkable was that the Constitutional Court
seemed to question the supremacy of Parliament - since the Supreme Court
had created a remedy for intangible assets in contrast to the wording of Sec.
253 of the Civil Code, and to suggest that the Judiciary was not wholly bound
by statutory law at all, but that there was a right of "creative jurisprudence"
("schoepferische Rechtsfindung").1 19 Pointing to the implementation of Arti-
cle 20 (3) of the Constitution in 1949,120 the Court held that the Constitution
had altered the traditional civil law limitation to the statutory law:
Statutes and law ... are not necessarily identical .... Law is
not synonymous with the totality of written statutes... Social
conditions must often take priority over the text of a statute.
Rather than being static, norms reflect the context of social
relations in their socio-political environment; their content dif-
fers under these circumstances. This is especially so in the
present age, which has witnessed dramatic social and legal
change over the course of the 20th century. In such a context,
the judge cannot simply consult written law and meet his obli-
gation to declare the law. Instead, the judge has a 'free hand'
to interpret law in regard to substantive justice and changing
social conditions.
121
117. BVerfGE 34, 269 (281).
118. Id. at 281-82.
119. Id. at 287-88.
120. Art. 20 (3) states: The legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order; the execu-
tive and the judiciary by law and justice.
121. BVerfGE 34, 269 (288-89).
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1. Early Origins
The Ninth Amendment of the American Constitution, which provides that
"the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people,"'122 is the earliest and prob-
ably most authoritative articulation of the principle that certain fundamental
rights like the right to privacy exist, albeit unspecified in the Constitution.
1 2 3
The first judicial recognition of the right to privacy followed soon after the
ratification of the Constitution. In 1798, Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull,
124
proposed that natural law might render legislation invalid even if the legisla-
tion does not violate any specific constitutional principles or provisions. 125 In
the same decision, however, Justice Iredell stated that if " the legislature of
any member of the union, shall pass a law, within the general scope of their
constitutional power, the court cannot pronounce it to be void, merely because
it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice."'1 26 This
view prevailed from the early 1800's and lasted for the next 90 years.
127
In 1890, two Boston attorneys named Charles Warren and Louis Brandeis
(later he became a Supreme Court justice) propounded the right to privacy in
their famous law review article, 128 arguing that the law should recognize a
right to an "inviolate personality" that would protect "thoughts, emotions, and
sensations.., whether expressed in writing, or in conduct, in conversation, in
attitudes, or in facial expression,"'' 2 9 and that the courts should create this new
right rather than wait for legislators to act. "The intensity and complexity of
life" and "modem enterprise and invention," they said, made the time ripe for
judges to redefine the nature of personal rights to protect "appearance, sayings,
acts, and ... personal relation(s), domestic or otherwise."'
30
The New York Court of Appeals initially rejected Warren's and Bran-
deis' approach in Robertson v. Rochester Folding Box Co. '31 In 1903, in reac-
tion to Robertson, the New York legislature enacted a privacy statute which
imposed liability for unauthorized use of a person's name, portrait, or picture
122. U.S. CONST. Amend. IX.
123. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv L. REv. 737, 741 (1989).
124. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
125. Id. at 387-88.
126. Id. at 399.
127. See Rubenfeld, supra note 123, at 742. Though the Fourteenth Amendment, which was
enacted after the Civil War, gave the Supreme Court a great deal more constitutional material to
consider.
128. See WARREN & BRANDEIS supra note 3 at 193.
129. WARREN & BRANDEIS, 4 HARv L. REv. 193, 196 (1890).
130. Id. at 206, 213; see also DARIEN A. MCWHIRTER & JON D. BIBLE, PRIVACY AS A CON-
sTrruriONAL RIGHT 75 (1992).
131. 64 N.E. 442, 443 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1902).
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for advertising purposes. 132 Then, in 1923, the Supreme Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship
God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and gen-
erally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men. 13
3
The right to privacy has been further described "as against the (power of)
government, the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men." 134 Finally, in Thiede v. Town of
Scandia Valley,1 35 the Minnesota Supreme Court emphasized that
the entire social and political structure of America rests upon
the cornerstone that all men have certain rights which are in-
herent and inalienable. Among these are .. .the pursuit of
happiness; .. .and the right to establish a home and family
relations .... The rights, privileges, and immunities of citi-
zens exist nonwithstanding there is no specific enumeration
thereof in State Constitutions.
136
2. Griswold v. Connecticut137
The real "breakthrough" in the acknowledgement of a general right to
privacy came in 1965. The State of Connecticut had a birth control statute that
prohibited the use of contraceptives. Enforcement of this statute led to the
conviction in a "test case" of the executive and medical directors of the
Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, Estelle Griswold and Dr. C. Lee
Buxton. Convicted as accessories for giving married persons information, in-
struction and medical advice concerning the means of preventing contracep-
tion, each was fined $100.
Appellants alleged at trial that the statute as applied violated the Four-
teenth Amendment of the American Constitution.
The Court struck down the statute, at least as the statute applied to mar-
ried persons. In overturning the conviction, Justice William 0. Douglas, writ-
ing for the Court, stated that there was a "zone of privacy" within a
132. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW sec. 50-51 (West 1992 & Supp. 2001).
133. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
134. Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
135. 217 Minn. 218, 14 N.W. 2d 400 (N.W. 1944).
136. Id. at 405; for additional cases see Rubenfeld, supra note 123, n.27-43.
137. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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"penumbra" created by several guarantees of the Bill of Rights that includes
the right to personal privacy. 38 The State of Connecticut was found to have
unconstitutionally interfered with that privacy in enacting and enforcing the
ban on contraception.'
39
3. Roe v. Wade
140
"Jane Roe" - Norma McCorvey - was a poor Dallas woman who had
allegedly become pregnant as a result of a rape. A Texas statute criminalized
abortion and provided for prison terms of up to 10 years. Unable to obtain a
legal abortion in Texas, McCorvey carried the pregnancy to term and placed
the child for adoption. In her landmark suit against the State of Texas, she was
joined by plaintiffs "John and Mary Doe", a married couple, and a Dr.
Hallford, a licensed physician. They alleged that the Texas abortion statute
violated rights of personal privacy protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth,
and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Court invalidated the Texas statute,14' finding that the state had vio-
lated the woman's constitutional right to privacy. The Court established a
woman's right to have an abortion without undue restrictive interference from
the government. The Court held that a woman's right to decide for herself to
bring or not to bring a pregnancy to term is guaranteed under the Fourteenth
Amendment and that Government regulation could be upheld only if it was
narrowly tailored to promote a compelling state interest.142 In attempting to
balance the State's rights against the rights of the individual, Justice Blackmun
held that the State's legitimate interest in protecting potential life increased as
the pregnancy advanced. 143 While allowing that the State may forbid abor-
tions during the third trimester, Blackmun wrote that a woman is entitled to
obtain an abortion freely, after consultation with a doctor, in the first trimester
and in an authorized clinic in the second trimester. 44
4. Bowers v. Hardwick14
5
In August 1982, respondent, a gay Georgia man, was arrested in his home
for engaging in oral sex there with another man in violation of a Georgia
sodomy law. Under the statute, sodomy was defined as performing or submit-
ting to "any sex act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or
anus of another." It declared the offense of sodomy punishable by imprison-
ment for not less than one and not more than 20 years. Respondent then
138. Id. at 484.
139. Id. at 485-86.
140. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
141. Id. at 164.
142. Id. at 153-55.
143. Id. at 159.
144. Id. at 163.
145. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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brought suit in the Federal District Court, challenging the constitutionality of
the statute insofar as it criminalized consensual sodomy. He asserted that he
was a practicing homosexual.
The Court upheld the statute, holding that the fundamental right to pri-
vacy as guaranteed by the Constitution does not extend to sex acts regarded as
sodomy under state law, even if such acts take place between consenting
adults in the confines of the home.146 The Court, in a five to four opinion,
upheld the constitutionality of the Georgia statute on the grounds that it re-
flected a legitimate belief by society that certain sex acts are immoral and
unacceptable. 147 For the majority, neither the text of the Constitution, nor any
philosophy of individual freedom could serve as a principled basis for a judi-
cial definition for a right to engage in homosexual activity.
148
The dissenting Justices 149 believed that independent judicial review of
regulations on intimate sexual relations was essential because a basic aspect of
individual liberty depends on a person's freedom to make decisions regarding
intimate relationships and sexual matters. 150 In a very notable dissent, Justice
Harry Blackmun argued that the ruling violated one of the most fundamental
rights of all, "the right to be let alone."
1 51
5. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services
152
The State of Missouri enacted three statutes to regulate abortions, one of
which prohibited the use of public funds, employees or facilities for the pur-
pose of "encouraging or counseling" a woman to have an abortion not neces-
sary to save her life, and which required physicians to perform tests to
determine the viability of any fetus believed to be at least 20 weeks old by
performing "such medical examinations and tests as are necessary to a finding
of (the fetus') gestational age, weight and lung maturity." Moreover, the pre-
amble of the statute declared that "(the) life of each human being begins at
conception," and that "unborn children have protectible interests in life, health
and well being." It required that all state laws be interpreted to provide unborn
children with the same rights enjoyed by other persons, subject to the Federal
Constitution and Supreme Court precedent. Plaintiffs, state-employed health
professionals and private non-profit corporations providing abortion services,
brought suit, challenging the constitutionality of the Missouri statute. The
District Court struck down each of the above provisions, among others, and
enjoined their enforcement. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit af-
146. Id. at 191-95.
147. Id. at 196.
148. Id. at 191-95.
149. Justice Blackmun dissented, with whom Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice
Stevens joined. See id. at 199.
150. Id. at 205.
151. Id. at 199.
152. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
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firmed, ruling that the provisions in question violated the Supreme Court's
decisions in Roe v. Wade and subsequent cases.
1 53
Without overruling Roe v. Wade, the majority of the Supreme Court up-
held the restrictions as constitutional.1 54 Chief Justice Rehnquist, delivering
the opinion of the Court, concluded that the preamble did not by its terms
regulate abortions or any other aspect of appellees' medical practice, but could
also be interpreted to do no more than offer protections to unborn children. 155
The other restrictions would not contravene the Supreme Court's abortion
precedents, either, as Missouri's decision to use public facilities and employ-
ees to encourage childbirth over abortion would place no governmental obsta-
cle in the path of a woman who chose to terminate her pregnancy.15 6
In a strong dissent, Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Brennan and
Justice Marshall joined, criticized the plurality's approach as being "far more
remarkable for the arguments that it does not advance than for those it
does."' 157 "Never in my memory," Justice Blackmun wrote:
Never in my memory has a plurality announced a judgment of
this Court that so foments disregard for the law and for our
standing decisions. Today, Roe v. Wade and the fundamental
constitutional right of women to decide whether to terminate a
pregnancy, survive but are not secure. The plurality does not
even mention, much less join, the true jurisprudential debate
underlying this case: whether the Constitution includes an
'unenumerated' general right to privacy as recognized in
many of our decisions . . . . These are questions of unsur-
passed significance in this Court's interpretation of the Con-
stitution, and mark the battleground upon which this case was
fought .... As we recently reaffirmed... few decisions are
'more basic to individual dignity and autonomy' or more ap-
propriate to that 'certain private sphere of individual liberty'
that the Constitution reserves from the intrusive reach of gov-
ernment than the right to make the uniquely personal, inti-
mate, and self-defining decision whether to end a pregnancy
.... It is impossible to read the plurality opinion.., without
recognizing its implicit invitation to every State to enact more
and more restrictive abortion laws . . . . Thus, 'not with a
bang, but with a whimper,' the plurality discards a landmark
case of the last generation, and casts into darkness the hopes
and visions of every woman in this country who had come to
153. Reproductive Health Services v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1988)
154. Supra note 152, at 522.
155. Id. at 506.
156. Id. at 510.
157. Id. at 537, 546.
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believe that the Constitution guaranteed her the right to exer-
cise some control over her unique ability to bear children. 58
6. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health
159
On the night of January 11, 1983, Nancy Cruzan lost control of her car as
she traveled down a road in Missouri. The car overturned, and Cruzan was
found lying face down in a ditch without detectable respiratory or cardiac
function. Paramedics were able to restore her breathing and heartbeat at the
accident site, and she was transported to a hospital in an unconscious state.
An attending neuro-surgeon diagnosed her as having sustained probable cere-
bral contusions compounded by significant anoxia (lack of oxygen). Such an
anoxic state leads to permanent brain damage after 6 minutes and it was esti-
mated that Cruzan was deprived of oxygen from 12 to 14 minutes. She re-
mained in a coma for approximately three weeks and then progressed to an
unconscious state in which she was able to orally ingest some nutrition. Sur-
geons implanted a gastrostomy feeding and hydration tube in Cruzan with the
consent of her then husband. Subsequent rehabilitative efforts proved unavail-
ing. She remained in what is called a "persistent vegetative state," a condition
in which a person exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indications of signifi-
cant cognitive function.16°
After it became apparent that Nancy Cruzan had virtually no chance of
regaining her mental faculties, her parents asked the hospital to terminate the
artificial nutrition and hydration procedures, which would cause her death.
The employees of the hospital refused. The parents then sought and received
authorization from the State Trial Court for termination. The Court found that
a person in Cruzan's condition had a fundamental right under the State and
Federal Constitutions to refuse or direct the withdrawal of "death prolonging
procedures."1 61 The Court also found that Cruzan's "expressed thoughts at
age twenty-five in a somewhat serious conversation with a housemate friend
that if sick or injured she would not wish to continue her life unless she could
live at least halfway normally suggests that given her present condition she
would not wish to continue on with her nutrition and hydration."'
62
The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed by a divided vote. The Court
recognized a right to refuse treatment embodied in the common law doctrine
of informed consent, but expressed skepticism about the application of that
doctrine in the circumstances of this case. The Court also declined to read a
broad right of privacy into the State Constitution which would "support the
right of a person to refuse medical treatment in every circumstance," 163 and
158. Id. at 546-57.
159. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 268.
163. Id.
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expressed doubt as to whether such a right existed under the U.S. Constitution.
It then decided that the Missouri Living Will statute 64 embodied a state policy
strongly favoring the preservation of life. The Court found that Cruzan's
statements to her roommate were "unreliable for the purpose of determining
her intent, and thus insufficient to support the co-guardians claim to exercise
substituted judgment on Nancy's behalf."' 65 It rejected the argument that
Cruzan's parents were entitled to terminate her medical treatment, concluding
that "no person can assume the choice for an incompetent in the absence of the
formalities required under Missouri's Living Will statutes or the clear and con-
vincing, inherently reliable evidence absent here." The Court also expressed
the view that "broad policy questions bearing on life and death are more prop-
erly addressed by representative assemblies"1 66 than judicial bodies.
In a 5-4 vote, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Missouri Supreme
Court decision.167 To answer the question whether Nancy Cruzan had a right
under the U.S. Constitution that required the hospital to withdraw life-sus-
taining treatment from her, Chief Justice Rehnquist, delivering the opinion of
the Court, first turned to the common law doctrine of informed consent. Cit-
ing Justice Cardozo in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital,'168 Rehn-
quist pointed out that every person of adult years and sound mind had a right
to determine what should be done with his own body and that a patient gener-
ally possesses the right not to consent, i.e., to refuse treatment. 169 Moreover, a
number of courts had based a right to refuse treatment on a constitutional
privacy right.170 However, the Court emphasized that the determination that a
person had a "liberty interest" under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not end the inquiry, but that these liberty interests had to be
balanced against the relevant state interests, in particular the legitimate interest
of a state to safeguard a person's choice between life and death through the
imposition of heightened evidentiary requirements. ' 7 ' The Court - assuming
for the purposes of the pending case that the U.S. Constitution in fact granted a
competent person a right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition - held
that a State might properly decline to make judgments about the "quality" of
life that a particular individual may enjoy, and was entitled to guard against
potential abuses in such cases.' 72 The Court stated:
164. MO. REV. STAT. § 459.010-.055 (1986).
165. 497 U.S. 261, 268 (1990).
166. Id. at 269.
167. Id. at 287.
168. Schloendorff v. New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129-130, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
169. 497 U.S. 261, 269-70 (1990).
170. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 38-42, 355 A.2d at 662-664; Supt. of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266, 420 N.E.2d 64, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858, 102 S.Ct. 309, 70 L.Ed.2d 153
(1981); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
171. 497 U.S. 261, 279-281 (1990).
172. Id. at 281-282.
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We believe that Missouri may permissibly place an increased
risk of an erroneous decision on those seeking to terminate an
incompetent individual's life-sustaining treatment. An errone-
ous decision not to terminate results in a maintenance of the
status quo; the possibility of subsequent developments such as
advancements in medical science, the discovery of new evi-
dence regarding the patient's intent, changes in the law, or
simply the unexpected death of the patient despite the admin-
istration of life-sustaining treatment at least create the poten-
tial that a wrong decision will eventually be corrected or its
impact mitigated. An erroneous decision to withdraw life-sus-
taining treatment, however, is not susceptible of correction.
173
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor opined that a seriously ill or
dying patient whose wishes were not honored might feel a captive of the ma-
chinery required for life-sustaining measures or other medical interventions,
and that such forced treatment might burden the individual's liberty interests
as much as any state coercion.1 74 Thus, the liberty guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause had to be construed to protect, "if it protects anything, an indi-
vidual's deeply personal decision to reject medical treatment, including the
artificial delivery of food and water."'
' 75
7. Planned Parenthood v. Casey
1 76
The State of Pennsylvania enacted its Abortion Control Act in 1982, and
amended it in 1988 and 1989. Planned Parenthood challenged five provisions
of the Act. The Act contained an informed consent requirement, a 24-hour
waiting period requirement, a spousal notification requirement, a parental con-
sent requirement, and a reporting requirement. Although the essential holding
of Roe v. Wade was reaffirmed, 177 a plurality of the Court rejected the trimes-
ter test that Roe established.178 In addition, a different plurality ruled that state
laws that regulate abortions would be upheld as long as the laws do not create
an "undue burden" or present a "substantial obstacle" to the woman's
choice.1 79 As to the right to privacy in general, the Court said:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family rela-
tionships, child rearing, and education .... Our cases recog-
nize 'the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
173. Id. at 283.
174. Id. at 288.
175. Id. at 289.
176. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
177. Id. at 846.
178. Id. at 872-73.
179. Id. at 874-876.
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from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fun-
damentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child.' . . . . Our precedents 'have respected the
private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.' ...
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty of the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the uni-
verse, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about theses
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were
they formed under compulsion of the State.
180
C. Comparison
Comparing the development of the right to privacy in Germany and the
U.S. reveals a number of similarities. From the outset, the lack of specific
provisions relating to the right to privacy in both the U.S. Constitution and the
German Civil Code urged both countries' highest courts to find an alternative
way to effectively protect personality rights. As if the problem of not having
an explicit protective provision was not difficult enough to solve, the German
Reichsgericht and later the German Supreme Court were faced with the fact
that Sec. 253 Civil Code seemed to bar any compensation for non-material
injuries for violations of the right to privacy.
Both countries' courts discerned the necessity of protecting certain ina-
lienable rights of the human being, and developed the right to privacy on a
case-by-case basis. In the U.S., the first attempts were made shortly after the
ratification of the Constitution, but these attempts turned out to be unsuccess-
ful for more than a century. In Germany, the "general right to personality"
was accepted more than fifty years after the enactment of the Civil Code, but
only five years after the enactment of the (new) German Constitution. In their
efforts to establish a right to privacy, both the American and the German
courts put emphasis on the social and technological changes which occurred in
the 20th century. American courts pointed out that some "natural law" ren-
dered certain legislation invalid if it violated inalienable privacy rights.
Similarly, the German Supreme Court held that social conditions often
had to take priority over the text of a statute. Notably, the fact that the courts
in Germany, rather than the German legislature, established the right to pri-
vacy is unusual and resembles more a common law than a civil law approach.
It has been subject of discussion whether the German courts have really been
entitled to such an extreme form of "richterlicher Rechtsfortbildung" (judicial
development of the law) under the principle of the separation of powers
180. Id. at 851.
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(Grundsatz der Gewaltenteilung).181 However, the establishment of the doc-
trine of a general right to personality has been characterized as one of the
greatest achievements ever by a German court.
1 82
Finally, both countries' highest courts have both established and re-
stricted privacy rights. The German Supreme Court limited its recognition of
the "general right to personality" in Ginsengwurzel by establishing the "seri-
ous fault" and "objectively significant injury" requirements for damages under
Sec. 847 Civil Code. Likewise, after the right to privacy had been established
by the United States Supreme Court in Griswold and Roe in 1965 and 1973,
the Court's later decisions focused more on limiting rather than broadening
privacy rights.
IV. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY & ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES: SELECTED AREAS OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS
A. The Right to Procreate Versus the Right Not to Procreate
1. Germany
a. The Right to Procreate as a Protected Legal Right within Arts. 1, 2
Constitution and Sec. 823 Civil Code
The right to procreate would undoubtedly be protected by the broad pro-
visions of Arts. 1 and 2 (1) of the German Constitution. 183 A much more
controversial issue is whether the right to procreate (called "Recht auf
Familienplanung," which literally is to be translated into "the right to engage
in family planning"1 84 and which has been defined as the right to decide
whether, when and how often parents want to have children) 185 is protected
under the tort provision of Sec. 823 (1) Civil Code. The discussion whether or
not to acknowledge such a right began in the early 1970's when the courts for
the first time were confronted with cases which dealt with negligence based,
unwanted pregnancies.186 A number of German scholars have argued that
such a right should be part of the general right to privacy under Sec. 823 (1)
181. Sec. 20 (2) of the German Constitution states: All state authority is derived from the
people. It shall be exercised by the people through elections and other votes and through spe-
cific legislative, executive, and judicial bodies.
182. See WALTER ERMAN & HERMANN WEITNAUER, HANDKOMMENTAR ZUM BUERGERLICH-
EN GESETZBUCH, 1. BAND (8th ed. 1989), Anh. zu Sec. 12 n.3; JOSEF ESSER & HAND-LEo
WEYERS, SCJ1;DREcrr, BAND II: BESONDERER TErL (6th ed. 1984) Sec. 55 I 1 b); THEODOR
MAUNZ & GUENTER DUERIG & ROMAN HERZOG, GRUNDGESETZ, KOMMENTAR, BAND I (May
1994), Art. 1 (1) n.38.
183. Cf BVerfGE 39, 1 (42-43).
184. See Harrer, supra note 11, at 108.
185. York Schnorbus, Schmerzensgeld wegen schuldhafter Verletzung von Sperma, JuS
1994, 830 (835).
186. See BGHZ 76, 249; 76, 259; LG Itzehoe, FamRZ 1969, 90.
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Civil Code, 187 the majority of the authors discussing that right, however, have
reacted with disapproval. 188 Thus, the courts have left the question explicitly
open until 1983, when the Supreme Court decided the following case.
b. "Wrongful Life"
189
The first plaintiff, the legitimate daughter of the second and third plain-
tiff, was born on February 24, 1977. The first plaintiff suffered severe dam-
ages to her health because the second plaintiff, her mother, had caught German
measles (rubella) during the first weeks of her pregnancy. The plaintiffs
charged the defendant gynecologist with having failed to diagnose the
mother's illness with the result that the pregnancy - which had been desired
in principle - was not terminated.
The child and her parents asked for a declaration that, subject to a statu-
tory assignment, the defendant was liable "to pay compensation in respect of
all the damage which they have suffered or will suffer in the future as a result
of the second plaintiffs infection during her pregnancy." 190 The District
Court dismissed the first plaintiffs claim but granted the parents the declara-
tion which they had sought. The Court of Appeals of Munich rejected the first
plaintiff's appeal and, upon the defendant's appeal, rejected the parents' claim
as well. It emphasized that the defendant had not caused the injury to the first
plaintiff; to the contrary, he was responsible for the fact that the first plaintiff
was alive and enjoyed legal capacity.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar
as the claims of the parents were concerned. 191 The gynecologist was held
liable on a contractual basis, because in his capacity as a medical practitioner,
he had received and accepted the mandate of investigating the danger of seri-
ous injury to the child which could result from the infection of the mother
during the first weeks of her pregnancy. The Court decided that he had carried
out this mandate negligently. 192
This holding, however, only concerned the compensatory damages under
Sec. 249 et seq. Civil Code. When confronted with the question of whether
the gynecologist's negligence would also give rise to tort damages for pain
and suffering (Schmerzensgeld) under Sec. 823 (1), Sec. 847 (1) Civil
187. See, e.g., ARNO DEBO, DER UNTERBL EBENE SCHWANGERSCHArSABBRUCH 81 (1986);
HERBERT HARRER, ZIViLREcHTLicHE HAFTUNG BEI DURCHKREUZTER FAMILIENPLANUNG, 237,
256, 370 (1989).
188. See, e.g., WOLFGANG DEUCHLER, DIE HAFTUNG DES ARZTEs FUER DIE UNERWUENSCHTE
GEBURT EtNEs KINDES ("WRONGFUL BIRTH"), EE RECHTSVERGLEICHENDE DARSTELLUNG DES
AMERIKAN1SCHEN uND DEUTSCHEN REcHTs 192 (1984); KATHARINA WAIBL, KINDESUN-
TERHALT ALS SCHADEN 197 (1986).
189. BGHZ 86, 240; translation by LiPsTEiN in MARKEsINIs, supra note 80, at 142.
190. Id.
191. BGHZ 86, 240 (241).
192. Id. at 244.
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Code, 193 the Court held that such damages - as the defendant did not inter-
fere directly with the personal health of the second plaintiff by involving her in
an unwanted birth - were only possible on the grounds that the birth of the
first plaintiff had exceeded the inflictions which accompany a birth without
complications.1 94 To the contrary, the Court explicitly rejected basing such
damages on the possible violation of the second plaintiff's right to privacy in
the form of her right to decide whether or not to procreate. "No pecuniary
damages can be awarded," the Court held, "in respect of a violation of the
"right to plan a family" as an emanation of the general right to one's personal-
ity [references] if a decision involving the personality of the party affected was
only frustrated in fact - as was here the case."
' 195
Although the Court's holding has a limited effect because it only applied
to frustrations "in fact," there has been no German court which accepted a
"right to plan a family" since this decision.' 96 The Courts' reasoning is that
Sec. 823 Civil Code is protecting the integrity of a person, not an activity, and
the planning of a family is classified as fitting in the latter category only.
197
c. The Destruction of Frozen Sperm as a Bodily Injury
In 1993, however, the German Supreme Court decided the following
case: 198 The plaintiff, at the age of 31, had to undergo surgery for the removal
of scrotal cancer. He was informed that the operation would result in his be-
come infertile. Hence, he requested the defendant hospital to freeze (cry-
opreserve' 99) some samples of his sperm and keep them for him. The hospital
did so. The plaintiff became infertile. Later, the plaintiff got married. Since
he and his wife wanted to have children, he requested that his wife be impreg-
nated with his sperm. It turned out that, due to negligent behavior of employ-
ees of the hospital, the samples had been destroyed without the plaintiffs
consent.
193. See supra notes 95 and 105.
194. BGHZ 86, 240, 248 (The second plaintiff needed a Caesarian operation to bear the first
plaintiff).
195. Id. at 249.
196. See, e.g., OLG Duesseldorf, NJW 1992, 1566 (1567).
197. It is well established under German law that tortious duties are not imposed, like guar-
antees in the law of sales, in order to protect a contractor's expectations of utility and value in
the acquisition of an undefective thing, see BGHZ 77, 215 (218); BGHZ 80, 186 (188). They
rather relate to the interest which people have in the integrity of their belongings or possessions,
in not having them adversely affected by the chattel which the manufacturer puts into commerce
(Integritaetsinteresse), see BGHZ 86, 256. A defendant is not liable on the basis of Sec. 823
(1) Civil Code if only the plaintiffs financial interest (Aequivalenzinteresse) and not his interest
in the integrity of his property (Integritaetsinteresse) were affected, see BGHZ, NJW 1992,
1678.
198. BGHZ 124, 52 = NJW 1994, 127; translation in part by N. SIMS in: WALTER VAN
GERVEN, TORTS 177, HORT PUBLISHING, (1999).
199. For details of the procedure of cryopreservation see VOSS, supra note 23, at 8 n.39;
Snyder, supra note 19, n.7.
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The plaintiff brought suit against the hospital for payment of
"Schmerzensgeld" in the amount of DM 25,000. He argued that Sec. 847 (1)
German Civil Code 2°° should, by analogy, apply to a breach of his general
right to privacy. The District Court and the Court of Appeals of Frankfurt
(a.M.) both rejected plaintiffs claim, arguing in accordance with the "wrong-
ful life" decision that Sec. 823, 847 German Civil Code would not protect a
right to procreate as a special application of the right to privacy.
The German Supreme Court, reversing the lower courts' decisions, found
for the plaintiff.20 1 Surprisingly, however, the court's rationales were not
based - as it had been argued by the plaintiff - on a violation of the plain-
tiff s right to procreate, but instead the rationale was based on the theory of a
violation of the physical integrity of the plaintiff.20 2 The court reasoned that a
body part that gets separated from the human body will - according to the
predominant though not uncontested view - become an object. The conse-
quences of this are that the right of the affected person to his body becomes
transformed into ownership of the separated body part.20 3 If this view was, as
the Court of Appeals had held, also true for cryopreserved sperm, then the
destruction of the plaintiffs sperm could not be deemed a bodily injury for
which Sec. 847 Civil Code confers a claim sounding in damages. According
to the Supreme Court, this view does not fit the context of modem assisted
reproduction technologies. 20 4 It therefore held that the concept of bodily in-
jury within the meaning of Sec. 823, 847 Civil Code had to be interpreted
more broadly, i.e. "any unauthorized interference," in one person's integrity,
should be prohibited. 205 "What is protected by Sec. 823 (1) Civil Code," the
Supreme Court went on to say, "is not the material substance, but the existen-
tially determined scope of personality which materializes in how one feels
physically. Sec. 823 (1) Civil Code protects the body as the basis of
personality. '2
0 6
Taking into consideration present-day medical possibilities, the right of
self-determination which the holder of the right derives from the general right
to privacy, would, according to the Supreme Court, assume additional signifi-
cance for the object of protection, namely the body:
Medical advances enable components to be removed from the
body and to be reincorporated in it later. That is true, for ex-
ample, of skin and bone parts intended for transplantation in
the person's own body, of eggs removed for fertilization and
of blood donation intended for oneself. If components are re-
200. See supra note 105.
201. BGHZ 124, 52 (53).
202. Id. at 54-55.
203. Id. at 54.
204. Id. at 54-55.
205. Id. at 54.
206. Id.
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moved from the body in order subsequently to be reunited
with it in accordance with the intention of the holder of the
right for the purpose of preserving bodily functions or of per-
forming them, then the view taken of Sec. 823 (1) Civil Code
as affording comprehensive protection of physical integrity
whilst preserving the right of self-determination of the holder
of the right, must lead to the result that those components,
even when separated from the body, retain functional unity
with it, from the point of view of the protective purpose of the
provision. It thus appears necessary to regard damage to or
destruction of such separated body parts as a bodily injury
within the meaning of Sec. 823 (1), 847 Civil Code.
20 7
The Court went on to distinguish these cases from situations where the
separated body parts are not intended by the holder of the right to be reinte-
grated into his body, and applied the abovementioned rule that separated parts
would become objects in a legal sense. This is due to the fact that the func-
tional unit no longer holds true.20 8 This would be true, for example, in the
case of donated organs which, in accordance with the wishes of the donor, are
intended to be implanted in another person, and in the case of blood donations
intended for third parties.
2 9
On the basis of these findings, the Court called the preserved sperm in-
tended by the holder of the right to be used for his reproduction an "excep-
tional case:" '2
10
On the one hand, the sperm is definitely separated from the
body of the holder of the right, on the other hand it is intended
to fulfill a typical bodily function, that of the reproduction of
the holder of the right. In any event, if, as in this case, the
preserved sperm is to take the place of lost reproductive ca-
pacity, it has no less weighty and substantive importance for
the physical integrity of the holder of the right, and the self-
determination and self-realization inherent therein, than the
egg or other body parts which on the basis of the foregoing
observations continue, even after removal from the body, to
be covered by the protection which the body enjoys under
Sec. 823 (1), 847 Civil Code.
211
The Court concluded that, the sperm being analogous and equivalent to a body
part which is to be returned to a person's body, there is an equivalent need of
207. Id. at 55.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 56.
211. Id.
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protection under the law of tort, and that therefore the same legal conse-
quences should apply under tort principles.
21 2
d. Discussion
The question of whether or not to accept the right to procreate under
German tort law should be answered in the affirmative. Only this interpreta-
tion would adequately clarify the increasing impact of the right of self-deter-
mination and the necessary protection of the right to privacy, especially in the
area of procreative freedom.
2 13
The Supreme Court's 1993 decision which declines to adopt this interpre-
tation can be criticized in a number of respects. For example, it seems to be
quite obvious that the criminal courts will not follow the civil court's approach
and hold that the destruction of frozen male sperm falls under the category of
the criminal offense of "battery.12 1 4 This would lead to the result that an iden-
tical term, "bodily injury," would be defined differently in civil and criminal
law. Although such a result is not per se impossible, it would nevertheless
conflict with the "unity of law" (Einheit der Rechtsordnung) principle of Ger-
man law.2 1
5
Moreover, some of the examples the Court offers do not survive a strict
scrutiny analysis. Human blood, as well as the female egg, is to be reinte-
grated into the body it comes from, whereas male sperm will be finally and
irreversibly disconnected from the man's body. Thus, there is no "functional
unity" in the latter, male case.216
Furthermore, the amount of DM 25,000 found to be adequate to compen-
sate the plaintiff for the injury he suffered seems inappropriately high. Ger-
man courts are generally much more restrictive than their American
counterparts when awarding damages. For example, in the case of rape, dam-
ages are usually in the area of DM 5,000 to DM 10,000.217 In the case of
mental pain and suffering, however, which seem to be quite similar to the case
at hand, the award is not usually more than DM 10,000 to DM 15,000 in the
212. Id. at 56-57.
213. Harrer, supra note 11, at 108.
214. Adolf Laufs & Emil Reiling, Schmerzensgeld wegen schuldhafter Vernichtung de-
ponierten Spermas?, NJW 1994, 775; Matthias Rohe, Anmerkung zu BGH vom 09.11.1993 (Z
124, 52), JZ 1994, 465 (466).
215. The "Einheit der Rechtsordnung" principle stands for the proposition that private, crimi-
nal and public law do not exist independently from each other, but coexist in a special reciprocal
relationship. Although the principle does not require that terms were defined identically in dif-
ferent contexts, it favors a construction which acknowledges that every single area of the law is
part of a greater whole. See PETER SCHWERDTNER, DAS PERSOENLICHKEITSRECHrr 2, 309 (1976);
THILO RAMM, EINFUEHRUNG IN DAS PRIVATRECHT, BAND 3 G 756 (1970); FRANZ VON LISZT,
DIE GRENZGEBIETE ZWlSCHEN PRIVATRECHT UND STRAFREcHT 8 (1889); Ernst Zitelmann, Auss-
chluss der Widerrechtlichkeit, AcP 99 1, 11 et seq. (1906).
216. See Forster, supra note 21, at 775.
217. See Volker Emmerich, Anmerkung zu BGH vom 09.11.1993 (Z 124, 52), JuS 1994, 351
note 8; Joachim Rosengarten, Der Praeventionsgedanke im deutschen Zivilrecht, NJW 1996,
1935 (1936).
260 [Vol. 21
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
civil courts.2 1 8 Hence, one could at least have expected an explanation why
the injury in this case was more onerous to the plaintiff.
However, the main point to be criticized, is that the Supreme Court did
not attempt to analyze the issues raised by the facts of this case under any
theory of a possible violation of the plaintiff's right to privacy in the form of
his right to procreate. Apparently, it saw itself "handcuffed" by its former
precedents which held that a right to procreate would not exist under Sec. 823
(1) Civil Code.
219
Such an approach could have been possible, however, for two different
reasons. First, the Supreme Court's distinction that Sec. 823 (1) Civil Code
protects the integrity but not the activity of a person is not feasible. This
results from the fact that integrity and activity are not, as the Court seems to
believe, exclusive of one another, but rather stand in a special reciprocal rela-
tionship. For example, what benefit does the owner of property have from the
fact that the item he owns is unscathed if he is not entitled to use his property?
Consistent with this idea, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that a viola-
tion of the protection of property according to the meaning of Sec. 823 (1)
Civil Code does not only involve physical damage to the substance of an item,
but also the lasting or temporary disturbance of the usage of it.220 This simple
example already clarifies the uncertainty of the Court's distinction between
integrity and activity.
Secondly, this approach is possible because even if the Court's distinction
that only the integrity and not the activity is protected, the Court could and
should nevertheless have distinguished its former cases on the basis of the
special facts of the case. What really creates the problem the Court had with
the case is the puzzling term "right to family planning." "Planning" is indeed
an activity, namely the intellectual process that serves as a guide to determine
one's future behavior. 22' But the result of "planning" is a "plan," i.e. a pro-
gram that determines future behavior in advance.222 If such a plan has already
been made, why should it not be part of the rights protected by Sec. 823 (1)
Civil Code?
A comparison of a few hypotheses illustrates how much more convincing
an approach acknowledging a right to procreate is, rather than the Court's
excessive definition of "bodily injury." First hypothesis: The forecasted in-
fertility to be caused by the operation does - due to fortunate circumstances
- not take place. The plaintiff's sperm is destroyed by the clinic. In this
case, the Supreme Court would have difficulties if it wanted to deny a bodily
injury. There is no reason apparent why the sperm should not belong to the
218. See Andreas Slizyk, BECK'SCHE SCHMERZENSGELDTABELLE 288 NR. 606/289 NR. 711
(1993).
219. See Currie supra note 43.
220. BGH, NJW 1977, 2264 (2265); VersR 1995, 348.
221. See MEYERS ENZYKLOPAEDISCHES LEXIKON XVIII 756 (1976).
222. See BROCKHAUS ENZYKLOPAEDIE XIV 658 (1972).
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man's body just because he is still able to produce sperm. The sperm donated
to the reproductive clinic is as suited to be used for procreation as had the man
become infertile - maybe the man does not even know that he has not be-
come infertile. A consequent application of the Court's rationales would have
the consequence of having to hold the clinic liable for damages from bodily
injury to the man's body. To the contrary, according to the solution on the
basis of a right to privacy, one could evaluate to what extent the right to pro-
create of the potential parents is in fact reduced in value. If the man was still
fertile, the destruction of the sperm would not lead to liability in tort.
Second hypothesis: In order to protect his ability to procreate, the man
donates sperm to three different clinics, one located in Berlin, one in New
York and one in Sydney. The first sample gets destroyed after one year, the
second one after 10 years, and the third one after 25 years. It seems difficult
to assume that a person can spread one's body worldwide with the result that
the destruction of any of the bodily substances would result in tort claims by
this person. On the other hand, it is not obvious how one should determine an
objective restriction of the amount of sperm that should be attributed to the
human body. For example, it would not be convincing to hold that a tortious
destruction of sperm can only be found in the destruction of the last sample,
because one does not negate a bodily injury in case of the destruction of a
kidney even if the person still has another, functional one. Moreover, such an
approach would be in contrast to the Court's holding that the protection of the
body continues to have an effect on the separated substance, because it is not
plausible that the protection should be suspended until the penultimate sperm
is destroyed.
To the contrary, if one's argument is that of a right to procreate, one
could weigh to what extent the enforcement of this right has in fact been di-
luted. Accordingly, depending on the facts of a case, there could be a tortious
interference with one's right to procreate not only when the last sample is
destroyed, but earlier, because as a general rule, it is the right of the potential
parents to determine by how many samples they want their right to be pro-
tected. The chance to become parents can already be decreased when a sam-
ple is destroyed and there is still another one existing.
Third hypothesis: A man and his wife are getting divorced shortly after
the sperm is donated. Thus, the man abandons his plan to use the sample for
later paternity. However, years after the operation, he meets another woman
with whom he wants to have a child. The sample has been destroyed in the
meantime. 2
23
The right to change one's mind does not need any further discussion, as it
flows from the general right of self-determination every individual undoubt-
223. See Wolfgang Nixdorf, Zur aerztlichen Haftung hinsichtlich entnommener Koerpersub-
stanzen: Koerper, Persoenlichkeit, Totenfuersorg, VersR 1995, 740 (743) (donor blood for later
reinfusion, which is not needed due to successful surgery).
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edly has. The acknowledgement of this right, however, would, under the Su-
preme Court's approach, result into the consequence that there was a tortious
bodily injury if the sample was destroyed at the time the man had not aban-
doned his plan to use the sperm and at the time the plan was readopted, but not
in the time between these two moments. Hence, the legal determination would
depend on the state of mind of the donor, which will not always be obvious.
One could only solve that problem by holding that once a plan to have a child
with one partner has been abandoned, a man is, for all times, deprived of his
right to procreate in regard to the sperm he donated in view of this plan. In
this case, the breaking up of the partners could be regarded as a (rebuttable)
presumption that the sample is not to be used for the procreation of the part-
ners later. However, such a rule cannot be upheld by any legal theory, and
would, in practice, only be troublesome and costly. Also, it would be even
more unjust to a man who has become infertile in the meantime to deprive him
of any legal protection, although there would still exist a sample to realize his
wish to become the father of a child.
Thus, the only solution is to determine whether a plan to procreate existed
at the time the sperm was destroyed. This plan is made visible when a man
deposits sperm with a reproductive clinic. As long as the customer asks for
the storage of the sperm and he pays for the fees the clinic charges, there is -
even if there is a separation of the customer and his partner - the presump-
tion that he has the intent to use the sample for later procreation. Not until the
man asks for the destruction of the sample - a request which can also be
expressed by ceasing to pay for the charges, - the surrender of the plan to
procreate becomes obvious; if the customer changes his mind back and later,
again, wishes to procreate, he then has the obligation to inform the clinic, and
any destruction of the sperm in the meantime must be attributed to his fault.
Fourth hypothesis: Due to negligence of the reproductive clinic a woman
does not become fertilized with the sperm of her husband, but with the sample
of a donor, which the donor had given to the clinic before an operation had
made him infertile. The Supreme Court in this case could not hold that the
fertilization constituted an injury the donor's body, because the sperm has
fully achieved its destination, the association with a female egg. The fact
alone that a different woman than the intended one has been inseminated can-
not lead to a finding of a physical violation of the donor's right of protection
of his body within the meaning of Sec. 823 (1) Civil Code. The result would
be that - absent claims on the basis of contract law - the donor would have
lost his ability to procreate, without having any claims against the clinic. To
the contrary, under the approach of a right to procreate, the donor would have
such claims, because his plan was to have a certain woman fertilized, which
has become impossible after the insemination of the other woman. The donor
should be awarded damages from the clinic due to the frustration of his plan to
have a family.
26320021
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Fifth hypothesis: A woman secretly uses contraceptives while having
sexual intercourse with her partner. At the same time, the man intends to
inseminate the woman. In this case, the Supreme Court would have no other
choice other than to ascertain a bodily injury to the man's body committed by
the woman. The only way not to enforce the man's claim would be to rule that
he is estopped from doing so due to a precedence of the woman's right to
control her body over the man's right to protect his.
Under a right to procreate, on the other hand, if defined as a plan between
two partners to create a family, the solution would be obvious. The fact that
the woman used contraceptives would manifest that a mutual plan to create a
family did not exist, no matter what the woman had told the man. Thus, the
man would not be entitled to damages, as no plan to procreate has been
violated.
2. United States
Similar to the German definition, the right to procreate has been defined
as "the right to make contemporaneous decisions about how one's reproduc-
tive capacity will be used.122
4
a. Skinner v. Oklahoma
225
Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act226 provided for the steril-
ization, by vasectomy or salpingectomy, of "habitual criminals." A habitual
criminal was defined as any person who, having been convicted two or more
times, in Oklahoma or in any other state, of "felonies involving moral turpi-
tude," is thereafter convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in Oklahoma for
such crime. Expressly excepted from the terms of the statute were certain
offenses, including embezzlement.
The petitioner was convicted in 1926 of the crime of stealing chickens,
and was sentenced to the Oklahoma State Reformatory. In 1929 he was con-
victed of the crime of robbery with firearms, and was again sentenced to the
Reformatory. In 1934 he was convicted of robbery with firearms for the sec-
ond time, and was sentenced to the penitentiary. He was confined there in
1935 when the Act was passed. In 1936 the Attorney General instituted pro-
ceedings against him.22
7
Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the Act citing the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. A jury
found that the operation of vasectomy could lawfully be performed on him.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed by a 5-4 decision. The U.S. Su-
preme Court reversed the decision. It acknowledged that the Oklahoma Act
224. Coleman, supra note 19, at 57.
225. Skinner v Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
226. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 57, 171 (West 1935).
227. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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deprived individuals of "a right which is basic to the perpetuation of a race -
the right to have offspring." 228 Said the Court:
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very exis-
tence and survival of the race. The power to sterilize, if exer-
cised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects.
In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are
inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear. There
is no redemption for the individual whom the law touches.
Any experiment which the State conducts is to his irreparable
injury. He is forever deprived of a basic liberty.
229
b. Davis v. Davis
2 30
Junior and Mary Sue Davis married in April 1980. A couple of months
later, Mary Sue's right fallopian tube had to be removed, followed by a liga-
tion of her left fallopian tube, leaving her without functional fallopian tubes by
which to conceive naturally. Beginning in 1985, the Davises went through six
attempts of IVF, but the hoped-for pregnancy never occurred. A fertility clinic
in Knoxville, Tennessee, then offered them cryogenic preservation, scheduled
for November 1988. A gynecologist was able to retrieve nine ova for fertiliza-
tion. At that time, the Davises had no thoughts of divorce; there was no dis-




After fertilization was completed, a transfer was performed in December
1988; the rest of the four-to-eight cell entities were cryogenically preserved.
Unfortunately, a pregnancy did not result, and before another transfer could be
attempted, Junior filed for divorce. Mary Sue then asked for control of the
"frozen embryos" with the intent to have them transferred to her own uterus,
in a post-divorce effort to become pregnant. She later changed her mind and
asked for the authority to donate the "frozen embryos" to a childless couple.
Junior objected to both proposals, saying that he preferred to leave the em-
bryos in their frozen state until he decided whether or not he wanted to be-
come a parent outside the bounds of marriage.
The County Court granted the divorce and concluded that the eight-cell
entities at issue were not preembryos but were children "in vitro." It invoked
the doctrine of "parens patriae" and held that it was "in the best interest of the
children" to be born rather than destroyed. Finding that Mary Sue was willing
to provide such an opportunity, but that Junior was not, the trial judge awarded
her "custody" of the "children in vitro.
232
228. Id. at 536.
229. Id. at 541.
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The Court of Appeals explicitly rejected the trial court's reasoning, as
well as the result, and reversed. It found that Junior had a "constitutionally
protected right not to beget a child where no pregnancy has taken place," and
held that "there is no compelling state interest to justify ... ordering implanta-
tion against the will of either party."2 3
3
The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision,
holding that Junior was entitled to custody of the preembryos.234 Absent a
written agreement about the disposition of unused embryos and Tennessee
statute regulating such disposition, the Court noted the different models pro-
posed by medical-legal scholars, including the so-called "implied contract"
and "equity" models.2 35 The Court found both models to be unsuitable to
solve the pending case. Rather, the Court emphasized the need to weigh the
constitutionally protected interests at stake against each other,236 and found the
parties' exercise of their constitutional right to privacy to be determinative.
2 37
The Court said:
Here, the specific individual freedom in dispute is the right to
procreate. In terms of the Tennessee State constitution, we
hold that the right of procreation is a vital part of an individ-
ual's right to privacy. Federal law is to the same effect ....
If the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affect-
ing a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child.2 3
8
Thus, although the United States Supreme Court had never addressed the
issue of procreation in the context of IVF, it appeared clear to the Supreme
Court of Tennessee that the parties' right to procreative autonomy - com-
posed of the right to procreate on the one hand and the right to avoid procrea-
tion on the other239 - had to govern the dispute. The Court said that it was
"not unmindful of the fact that the trauma.., to which women are subjected in
the IVF process is more severe than is the impact of the procedure on the
men."240 However, the women's experience has to be seen, according to the
Court, "in the light of the joys of parenthood that is desired or the relative
anguish of a lifetime of unwanted parenthood. '241 Hence, Mary Sue and Jun-
233. Id.
234. Id. at 604.
235. Id. at 590-91.
236. Id. at 591 and 603-604.
237. Id. at 598.
238. Id. at 600 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
239. Id. at 601. 603.
240. Id. at 601.
241. Id.
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ior were regarded as "entirely equivalent gamete-providers, ' 242 and an interest
in avoiding genetic parenthood was held to be "significant enough to trigger
the protections afforded to all other aspects of parenthood. '243 Finally, in bal-
ancing the parties' interests, the Court considered the imposition of unwanted
parenthood on Junior, with all its possible financial and psychological conse-
quences,244 and the burden on Mary Sue of knowing that the lengthy IVF
procedures she underwent were futile, and that the preembryos to which she
contributed genetic material would never become children.2 45 It found that
Junior's interests were more important, because "donation, if a child came of
it, would rob him twice - his procreative autonomy would be defeated and
his relationship with his offspring would be prohibited. '246 The Court said in
dicta that the case would have been "closer," if Mary Sue had been seeking to
use the embryos herself and if she was not able to achieve parenthood by any
other reasonable means.
247
c. Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hospital of New York
248
A case that does not directly deal with the right to privacy, but resembles
the German case in BGHZ 124, 52, is the following decision: The Del Zios,
after their marriage in 1968, unsuccessfully tried to have children. In 1970,
Mrs. Del Zio learned that her fallopian tubes were blocked, and operations to
remove the blockage were unsuccessful. Mrs. Del Zio's physician, Dr. Wil-
liam Sweeney of New York Hospital, advised Mrs. Del Zio of the possibility
of attempting in vitro fertilization, although at that time the procedure had not
been successfully performed in humans. Mrs. Del Zio agreed, and the proce-
dure was undertaken on September 12, 1973. Dr. Sweeney removed the ova
at New York Hospital, the ova was taken to Presbyterian Hospital where Dr.
Shettles obtained semen from Mr. Del Zio, prepared the culture and placed it
in an incubator at Presbyterian where it was to remain for four days.249
The following day, September 13, 1973, defendant Dr. Vande Wiele
learned of the test tube and its contents, ordered it removed from the incubator
and brought to his office, and then had it placed in a deep freeze. These ac-
tions effectively terminated the procedure and destroyed the culture. When
Mrs. Del Zio learned of the destruction, she suffered mental distress. The Del
Zios brought suit under the theory of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. The jury, after deliberating for approximately 13 hours, found for the
242. Id.
243. Id. at 603.
244. Id. at 603.
245. Id. at 604.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14450.
249. Id.
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plaintiffs and awarded $50,000 damages for mental pain and suffering. Defen-
dants moved for judgment nonwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. 250
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
concluded that the verdict was fair, reasonable and lawful, and dismissed de-
fendant's motions.251 The District court found that there was sufficient credi-
ble evidence from which the jury could reasonably find that the plaintiffs had
met their burden of establishing the three elements of the intentional tort cause
of action under New York law.2 52 The District court further found that the
defendants acted with "utter disregard" of the substantial certainty that severe
emotional distress would follow from the decision to destroy the contents of
the test tube.253 Moreover, the court found that the jury could reasonably infer
from the medical evidence that there was more than an insignificant or remote
possibility of success of the procedure. This finding has been confirmed by




The abovementioned cases, including the abortion decisions mentioned
earlier, illuminate that the rights to procreate and to avoid procreation are, at
least in regard to natural/coital reproduction, well established in the law of the
U.S.25 5 These rights should include coital as well as, noncoital reproduction
via assisted reproductive methods.256 This is because protection is the result
of the insemination, not the act itself,257 and infertile couples possess the same
250. Id.
251. 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14450, at * 24.
252. Under New York tort law, one who intentionally or recklessly conducts himself toward
another person in a manner so shocking and outrageous that it exceeds all bounds of decency,
such person is liable to such other person for any resulting severe mental distress and conse-
quential expenses. Before a defendant can be held liable under this claim, a jury must be satis-
fied that the plaintiff has proven by a fair preponderance of evidence each of the following three
essential elements: First, that a defendant's conduct was so extreme, outrageous and shocking
that it exceeded all reasonable bounds of decency. Second, that a defendant acted with the
intent to inflict emotional distress or on the other hand that he acted recklessly and with utter
disregard of the consequences that might follow and under circumstances known to him which
made it substantially certain that the emotional distress would follow. And third, that the defen-
dants' conduct caused severe mental distress to the plaintiffs. See id. at * 5-6.
253. Id. at *14.
254. See Harrer, supra note 11 at 943.
255. See Pitrolo, supra note 8, at 168 n.149-151.
256. See Rao, supra note 35, at 1081 et seq.; Robertson, supra note 11, at 958 et seq.;
Robertson, supra note 11, at 1390; Snyder, supra note 19, n.73, 83-99; Triber, supra note 15, at
125; Smith, supra note 19 at 39-9, points out that "under international law, such a right might be
found within the right to health" and that "under U.S. law, a woman's right to the new reproduc-
tive biology may be grounded in the penumbra creating the right to privacy."
257. See Richard McCormack, How Brave a New World 311-12 (1981); Robertson, supra
note 11, at 960 n.66. However, a traditional Catholic view is that the unitive and the procreative
should be combined in one act, thus making the separation of sex and reproduction, either to
procure pleasure or to procure offspring, wrong.
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abilities to rear children as fertile couples. 258 The definition of the "right to
procreate" as the freedom to use one's procreative "capacity" 259 would not be
accurate, as persons who are incapable of reproducing on their own should be
protected as well. Thus, the right to procreate should protect married as well
as unmarried couples. 260 The decision to adopt a child should be regarded as
much a reproductive choice as is the decision to conceive through natural
means.261 Arguably, even a right to engage in genetic selection or cloning
might be part of that choice. 262 Finally, the right to procreative liberty might
even survive the death of a person,263 and could also include some limited
parental rights, in particular the right to raise a child.
264
The real problem is not the existence of a right to procreate, but the bal-
ancing of interests between the right to procreate on the one hand and the right
to avoid having offspring on the other. As has been pointed out by the Court
in Davis ,265 strong arguments can be made to give priority to the choice of the
partner who decides not to have children. First, immense financial obligations
result from becoming a biological parent. 266 Second, a pregnancy imposes
enormous physical burdens upon the woman. 267 Finally, and perhaps most
important, the knowledge of the existence of one's child can impose lifelong
psychological and emotional burdens on the parent. 268 These burdens might
also prohibit a woman from becoming artificially inseminated with donor
sperm without her husband's knowledge or consent and to have her husband
declared the legal father of the child.
269
However, the Court in Davis has also indicated that its decision would
have been much more difficult if Mrs. Davis desired the embryos for her own
reproduction and would have been unable to have offspring by any other
258. Robertson, supra note 11, at 1390. This could be an argument for a right of gay couples
as well, see Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity
for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 297. Recently, two gay British men have become the
parents of twins born in Modesto, California, to a surrogate mother using in-vitro fertilization.
They face a battle to win British passports for their son, Aspen, and daughter, Saffron. Lawyers
have warned Tony Barlow, 35, and Barrie Drewitt, 32, that as unmarried fathers, they have no
automatic right to pass their nationality to the twins and that birth certificates issued in the U.S.
might not be recognized in Britain. See Gays' Twins, USA Today, December 13, 1999.
259. See Coleman supra note 224.
260. See Rao, supra note 35, at 1080 n.8; Robertson, supra note 11, at 962 et seq.; Smith,
supra note 19, at 28, 41. However, whether the act of sexual reproduction continues to receive
constitutional protection when it occurs outside the boundaries of marriage is an open question.
261. See Cahn & Singer, supra note 19, at 170.
262. Robertson, supra note 11, at 953 and 1390-91.
263. Id. at 997.
264. See Snyder, supra note 19, n.64 et seq., 75, 126-127.
265. See infra text accompanying notes 265-267.
266. See Coleman, supra note 19, at 81 n.139.
267. See Forster, supra note 21, at 771; Robertson, supra note 11, at 1389.
268. See Coleman, supra note 19, at 82, 96-97; Robertson, supra note 11, at 979-80;
Tushnet, supra note 2, at 1367.
269. See Rao, supra note 35, at 1085.
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means.270 One partner's desire to have a child no less precious than the other
partner's choice to avoid having offspring.27' Some commentators have gone
one step further and argued that a partner unable to produce additional em-
bryos has a constitutional right to use the couple's remaining frozen embryos
to have a child. 272 This assumption stems from the vital importance procrea-
tion has for the individual: connecting people with nature and the next genera-
tion, giving them a sense of immortality, and enabling them to rear and parent
children.273 In rebuttal to the other partner's argument that the birth of a child
will result in financial obligations, one can point to the fact that these obliga-
tions can be extinguished.
274
Moreover, some courts and commentators have argued that one should
also consider the child's interest to be born in this context. For example, the
county court in Davis held that it was in the best interest of the child to be
born rather than to be destroyed, and the court gave this fact decisive impor-
tance in its decision.275 Similarly, some religious and right-to-life groups pro-
mote the "right-to-life" model.276 The Louisiana legislation that affords ferti-
lized eggs the same protection to life as that of (living) human beings277 is one
example of the influence these organizations have in some cases on the state
level. It has been pointed out that such a model places a heavy burden on
donors and sperm banks that would likely abolish IVF procedures in those
states.278
Finally, there may be state interests that could legitimately limit the right
to procreate under certain, although very limited circumstances. Courts have
uniformly upheld prison regulations that denied inmates, even if they are mar-
ried, the ability to procreate via artificial insemination using their own semen.
In Goodwin v. Turner,279 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit found
that a prison's policy against artificial insemination was constitutional because
it was "reasonably related to the legitimate penological interest of treating all
inmates equally, to the extent possible,' 280 and thus rejected the prisoner's
claim that he be allowed to provide a container of his sperm to his wife. In
Anderson v. Vasquez,281 a federal district court denied death row prisoners
their wish to preserve their semen for artificial insemination, reasoning that the
270. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W. 2d 588, 604 (Tenn., 1992).
271. See Rao, supra note 35, at 1086; Triber, supra note 15, at 125 ("two rights of equal
significance").
272. See Susan Remis Silver & Lee M. Silver, Confused Heritage and the Absurdity of Ge-
netic Ownership, 11 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 593, 614 (1998).
273. Robertson, supra note 11, at 1389; see also Robertson, supra note 11, at 956.
274. Coleman, supra note 19, at 81-82 n.140.
275. See supra note 221 at 596.
276. See Triber, supra note 15, at 135-36 n.162.
277. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. sec. 9:121-133.
278. Triber, supra note 15, at 136; see also Feiler, supra note 22, at 2442, 2450 et seq.
279. 908 F.2d 1395 (8' Cir. 1990).
280. Id. at 1400.
281. 827 F.Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
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fundamental right to procreate was not consistent with imprisonment and thus
"does not survive incarceration. ' 282 Finally, in Percy v. New Jersey Depart-
ment of Corrections,283 the state appellate court held that security risks, scarce
resources, and equal protection concerns would justify a penitentiary policy
prohibiting inmate procreation through assisted reproductive means.
284
Balanced against each other, no bright line rule seems to exist that would
avoid all hardships that the colliding privacy rights produce. To the contrary,
only a balancing of interests on a case-by case basis is feasible to appropriately
weigh the interests involved under different circumstances. Under this ap-
proach, the gender of the partner who seeks reproduction should not affect the
analysis of the competing interests at stake. 285 Furthermore, if a partner can
have children with another partner, it seems appropriate to hold that the former
partner's wish not to become a parent has to be respected. 286 This has to be
true even when it has already cost the other partner significant financial, emo-
tional and physical efforts to get pregnant, e.g. if the woman's eggs have al-
ready been taken from her body for IVF.2 87 In addition, if the possibilities of
surrogacy or adoption are realistic alternatives to the creation of a child with
one's own genes, the wish to avoid offspring by the other partner should be-
come predominant.
3. Comparison
A comparison between German and U.S. law, as acknowledged by the
highest courts of both countries, shows many similarities and some differ-
ences. Although the German Constitutional Court would acknowledge a right
to procreate under Art. 2 (1) of the German Constitution,2 88 the German Su-
preme Court does not acknowledge a "right to plan one's family" as an aspect
of the general right to privacy under Sec. 823 Civil Code.289 This result is
surprising, as the general right to personality has been developed under ex-
press reference to the Constitution. The Supreme Court does compensate for
damages caused by the interference with a person's family planning. The
Court does this by extending the term "bodily injury" to include human sub-
stances that have been separated from the human body, even when these sub-
stances are not intended to be retransferred into the body from which they
come.2 90
282. Id. at 620.
283. 651 A.2d 1044 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
284. Id. at 1074.
285. Coleman, supra note 19, at 81, 85.
286. Id. at 82-83.
287. Id. at 86.
288. Cf BVerfGE 39, 1 (42-43).
289. Cf BVerfGE 12, 205 (259).
290. See id. at 258-260.
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Similar to the German situation, American courts fully acknowledge a
constitutional right to procreate.291 American courts have also awarded civil
damages for the tortious interference of a couple's plan to procreate. They
award this under the category of emotional distress.292 The German approach
is very problematic. It would be much more appropriate if German law ac-
knowledged a right to plan one's family under tort law. Although the Ameri-
can approach seems less open to attack, it has already been proposed to
acknowledge "wrongful destruction" as a new tort in American law. 293 Ger-
man courts could learn from considering the comments that Radhika Rao has
made, that "privacy does not simply guarantee individuals the right to sexual,
reproductive, and parental autonomy. It protects the relationship between peo-
ple that develop in the course of these activities, rather than the individual's
solo rights to engage in such activities. '294 These comments illuminate that it
is not the individual's activity, but a couple's plan that deserves protection
against tortious interferences.
A fundamental difference between German and American law is in the
area of damages for mental distress when one's right to procreate is violated.
As pointed out above, German courts are reluctant to award large pecuniary
damages for non-material injuries. 295 To the contrary, American courts have
awarded damages more generously, as seen in the Del Zio case.296 Such dam-
ages are questionable. However, the chances of one embryo implanting are
less than 10%.297 These monetary differences are to a great extent based on
the general differences in awarding damages in both countries.298
291. See id. at 264-267.
292. See id. at 267-268.
293. See Robertson, supra note 11, at 1036 n.335 (citing Cohen, The Brave New Baby and
the Law: Fashioning Remedies for the Victims of In Vitro Fertilization, 4 Am. J. L. & Med. 319
(1978); and see generally, Fanta, Legal Issues Raised by In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo
Transfer in the United States, 2 In Vitro Fertilization & Embryo Transfer 65, 80 (1985)).
294. Rao, supra note 35, at 1103; see also Coleman, supra note 19, at 85: "An individual's
unilateral decision to have a child without regard to her partner's views is simply not the sort of
intimate activity to which the right to procreate is meant to apply."
295. See id. at 260; see also VOSS, supra note 23, at 165-66.
296. See id at 267-268.
297. Robertson, supra note 11, at 1037 n.335.
298. It is noteworthy that German law does not provide for punitive damages, reasoning that
the punishment of a person belongs to criminal rather than private law. German courts have thus
declined to enforce American punitive judgments in Germany, see BGH, VersR 1992, 1287;
OLG Munich, NJW 1992, 3113; ADoLF BAUMBACH & WOLFGANG LAuTERBACH & JAN ALBERS
& PETER HARTMANN, ZIVILPROZESSORD-NING MIT GERIcHTsVERFASSUNGSGESETZ UND
ANDEREN NEBENGESETZEN Sec. 328 n.44 (53rd ed. 1995).
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B. The Right of Informational Self-determination Versus the
Right to Know One's Heritage
1. Germany
a. The Right to Know One's Heritage
The German Constitutional Court has, in accordance with the majority of
Germany's legal scholars, acknowledged a right to know one's heritage, based
on the assumption that such a right would be vital to "find and understand
oneself."2
99
i. The Right to Know One's Heritage 1300
After having reached full age, the plaintiff sought a judicial declaration
that she was not the marital child of the husband of her mother. However,
according to Sec. 1598, in conjunction with Sec. 1596 I No.2 Civil Code, a
child who recently acquired majority status was only entitled to pursue a dec-
laration of her legitimacy or illegitimacy so that she could determine her heri-
tage in the event that her parents were divorced or separated for three years.
In this case, the mother and her husband declared that they did not intend to
separate. The District Court suspended the trial and submitted the question to
the Constitutional Court whether the abovementioned sections of the Civil
Code were constitutional.
30 1
The German Constitutional Court held that Sec. 1593 and Sec. 1598, in
conjunction with 1596 1 No.2 Civil Code, were unconstitutional insofar as they
barred a majority age child from the judicial clarification of his heritage with-
out exceptions.30 2 The court announced a substantive right to know one's
heritage:
It is a violation of general personality rights . .. to limit a
majority age child's ability to determine her heritage to the
statutorily enumerated circumstance . . . . The right to free
development of personality and human dignity guarantees all
individuals an autonomous area of private life formation in
which they can develop and protect their individuality ....
Knowledge and development of individuality are closely
bound with certain constitutive facts. Among these is in-
cluded one's heritage. 30 3
Knowledge of heritage is decisive because it reveals genetic origin and is thus
central to individual identity. It can be described as a "key factor for individ-
ual self-discovery and self-understanding . . . . As an individual character
299. See BVerfGE 79, 256 (269).
300. BVerfGE 79, 256.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 266.
303. Id. at 268-69.
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trait, ethnicity and knowledge of heritage offer individuals... important con-
nections to understanding and development of their own individuality. Hence,
personality rights include knowledge of one's heritage. ' '30 4 The Court limited
the breadth of its holding, however, by ruling that "Article 2 in connection
with Article 1 [German Constitution] confers no right to obtain knowledge of
one's heritage; rather, they protect against the withholding of attainable
information."
30 5
ii. The Right to Know One's Heritage 1H306
According to Sec. 1598 Civil Code, a two-year statute of limitation gov-
erned the right of adults newly of age to seek judicial declaration of their
biological origin. The German Constitutional Court invalidated this statute,
30 7
relying on the fact that the limitation might operate to foreclose any possibility
for young people to discover their heritage.30 8 The Court held that "[t]he im-
possibility of clarifying one's own heritage can be a considerable burden and
can undercut one's (inner) security. '' 3° 9 It then ordered that the law must be
changed, consistent with personality rights, so that a child might learn her
identity.
3 10
b. The Right of Informational Self-determination
Likewise, the Constitutional Court has established a right of informa-
tional self-determination. 311 This right provides the individual with protection
against the collection, processing and usage of personal data.312 The term
'data' in this context is broadly defined, covering more than intimate informa-
tion in a narrow sense.
31 3
i. The Census Act Case
314
In 1983 the German government enacted the Federal Census Act, which
required the collection of comprehensive data concerning Germany's demo-
graphic and social structure. The Act set the parameters for the country's pop-
ulation count and required rudimentary personal information, such as name,
gender, address, nature of household occupants, marital status, religious affili-
ation, job occupation, and work setting. The Act also required citizens to fill
out detailed questions concerning their sources of income, mode of transporta-
304. Id. at 269.
305. Id. at 269.
306. BVerfGE 90, 263.
307. Id. at 264.
308. Id. at 272.
309. Id. at 273.
310. Id. at 276-77.
311. See BVerfGE 27, 1 ("Mikrozensus").
312. See DIETER Schwab, Einfuehrung in das Zivilrecht n.285 (12th ed. 1995).
313. See OLG Nuremberg, [NJW] 28.2 (1993), 796 (796-97).
314. BVerfGE 65, 1.
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tion to and from work, educational background, and use of dwelling, including
method of heating and utilities. The Act further allowed information obtained
to be transmitted to the local government, which could then use the informa-
tion for the purpose of planning, environmental protection, and redistricting.
Over one hundred people filed suit, complaining that the Act's intrusiveness
threatened their privacy rights.
The German Constitutional Court agreed with this statement, at least tem-
porarily, and suspended the census until its constitutionality could be deter-
mined.315 The core concern was that comprehensive and intrusive population
surveys may yield personality profiles that, when digested by modem comput-
ing techniques, will facilitate the government's ability to voluntarily access
such information at will and use it as it sees fit. This carries with it the danger
of converting the human being into a mere object of statistical survey, deper-
sonalizing the human element. 316 The more is known about a person, the eas-
ier this person can be controlled.
According to the Constitutional Court, the right of informational self-de-
termination protects against such governmental intrusions. 317 The right has
been defined as
the authority of the individual to decide fundamentally for
himself, when and within which limits personal data may be
disclosed .... [T]his decisional authority requires a special
measure of protection under present and future conditions of
automatic data processing. [For example,] the technological
capability of storing [highly] personalized information con-
cerning specific people is practically unlimited and retrievable
in seconds... without concern for distance .... [T]his infor-
mation, when connected to other data sources, . . . can pro-
duce a complete or partial personality profile, over which the
affected individual has no control, and the truth of which he
cannot confirm .... The possibilities of acquiring informa-
tion and exerting influence have increased to a degree never
previously known. 318
ii. Disclosure of Medical Records 319
The right of informational self-determination is not unlimited. The plain-
tiff, a doctor, claimed damages from the defendant, an employee of an insur-
ance company. The insurance company asked the defendant to investigate a
315. Id. at 43.
316. Id. at 42-43.
317. Id. at 43.
318. Id. at 42-43.
319. BGHZ 24, 72; translation in part by N. SIMS in: VAN GERVEN, supra note 198, at 173
et seq.
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fraud that the plaintiff had possibly committed by submitting allegedly false
medical certificates. Allegedly, the plaintiff submitted these false certificates
to prove damage sustained as a consequence of physical injury caused to him
by a third party (K). In order to prove fraud, the defendant contacted the third
person's attorney(R) and showed him the false certificates. The plaintiffs
claim for damages was based on violations of a statutory duty of confidential-
ity and his right to privacy in respect of his health. Both the District Court and
the Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiffs claim.
The Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiffs request for review of the
Court of Appeals' decision.32 0 The Supreme Court held that, although a gen-
eral right to personality had to be recognized, the violation of that right could
only be established by a balancing of interests. 32 1 In this case, the Court found
that the interest of a patient in his medical files not being disclosed without his
consent outweighed the interest of an insurance company engaged in investi-
gating suspected fraudulent claims. The Court stated:
The notion of the general right to privacy has the breadth of a
general clause and is ill-defined .... The Court of Appeals
rightly takes the view that the unauthorized communication of
medical certificates concerning the state of health of another
person ... may constitute an interference with the domain of
secrecy protected by the right to privacy . . . . This is not,
however, an unqualified right. The general right to privacy
does not afford the possibility of the unrestrained implementa-
tion of one's own interests .... Limits are set by the twofold
prohibition on infringements of the constitutional order and
offences against good morals, and on infringing the rights of
others. In case of a possible interest arising from the fact that
everyone has the same general right to privacy and from the
fact that the free development of personality consists of indi-
vidual endeavors to excel, a dividing line is necessary in the
event of conflict which must be drawn on the basis of the
principle of a balancing of rights and interests .... Depend-
ing on the configuration of circumstances, the scope of the
right to privacy may vary considerably .... In truth the con-
siderations of the Court of Appeals come down, then, to this:
Under the circumstances prevailing, the plaintiff's interest in
confidentiality of the medical certificates concerning his state
of health was not so great as to outweigh the interest of the
defendant and of K in ascertaining whether the insurance
company or K had not received undue advantage. The Court
of Appeals thereby demonstrated the limitation of the plain-
320. Id. at 75.
321. Id. at 80.
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tiff's right to privacy in the preservation of confidentiality in
relation to his affairs, namely a limitation based on the balanc-
ing of rights and interests on the facts of the particular case. It
did not deem the scope of this right to extend so far as to
enable communication of the insurance documents to lawyer
R to be considered an infringement. That assessment is not
open to legal objection.
322
c. The Conflict Between the Right of Informational Self-determination and
the Right to Know One's Heritage
The right of informational self-determination and the fight to know one's
heritage may collide, as illustrated in the following case decided by the Consti-
tutional Court in 1997.323 The plaintiff had been born in 1959. Shortly there-
after, she was transferred to a children's home, and was later raised by foster
parents. The plaintiff tried to force her mother to tell her who her biological
father was, arguing she needed this information for personal reasons, as well
as for the enforcement of potential claims in regard to the law of inheritance.
The defendant mother, on the other hand, pointed to the fact that she had
engaged in sexual intercourse during the time of conception with a variety of
men, some of whom would now be married and live in intact families. Thus,
she was of the opinion that she did not have to name them.
324
The District Court found for the plaintiff on the basis of Sec. 1618a in
connection with 1934a et seq. Civil Code and in view of Art. 6 (5) of the
Constitution. 325 The Court of Appeals amended the judgment to include only
an obligation of the mother to tell her daughter, under reference of name and
address, with whom she had sexual intercourse in the time between the 181st
and 302nd day before the plaintiff was born. The defendant mother brought
"Verfassungsbeschwerde" (suit of unconstitutionality) based on a violation of
her right of informational self-determination (Art. 2 Constitution).
The Constitutional Court reversed, holding that an obligation to name the
men with whom she had sexual intercourse during the time of conception
would violate the mother's private sphere protected by Articles 2 (1) in con-
nection with 1 (1) of the Constitution.326 "The general right to privacy," the
Court wrote,
protects the inner personal area of life and the preservation of
its basic conditions. It encompasses the right to have one's
322. Id. at 78-83.
323. 1997 BVerfG, NJW, 1769.
324. Id.
325. Art. 6 (5) states: Children born outside of a marriage shall be provided by legislation
with the same opportunities for physical and mental development and for their position in soci-
ety as are enjoyed by those born within marriage.
326. Id. at 1769.
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private and intimate sphere protected. This includes family
matters and the personal, including the sexual relations to
one's partner. Moreover, the right to privacy protects the au-
thorization to freely decide whether or to what extent and to
whom one wants to reveal one's personal life.
327
The Court acknowledged, however, that this right to informational self-deter-
mination is not without its limits, i.e. restrictions have to be imposed whenever
it is in the predominant community's interest or when such a right would con-
flict with the constitutional right of another person.328 When balancing such
interests, the Court held, a judge has broad discretion as to which interest to
give priority:
Neither the child's right to know his heritage (Article 2 (1)
with 1 (1) Constitution) nor Articles 6 (5) or 14 (1) Constitu-
tion predetermine a special answer for the question whether a
child has a claim against its mother to name its father...
Whether such a claim exists has to be determined by the legis-
lature or the judiciary. 329
d. Discussion
The right of informational self-determination is of vital importance in the
area of human substances: blood and sperm hold a variety of information
about a person. 330 In addition, through scientific analysis, knowledge about a
human being can be gained which could not be more detailed.331 Whether and
to what extent such analyses are permissible must therefore be dependent on
the person's will.
With regard to the modem possibilities of genetic technology and their
impact on the blood and sperm of a person, a discussion evolved whether one
should acknowledge a "right to one's genetic sphere" as a special form of the
right of informational self-determination. 332 This would adequately express
the idea that a right exists which protects the individual right to make his
knowledge and the knowledge of third persons about his genetic constitution
dependent on his will. In particular, prior to a genetic analysis, such a right
would require a physician to fully inform the patient about the consequences
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 1769-70.
330. See NORBERT JANSEN, Die Blutspende aus Zivilrechtlicher Sicht 45 (1978); Michael
Schroeder & Jochen Taupitz, Menschliches Blut: Verwendbar Nach Belieben des Arztes? 44, 64
(1991).
331. See, e.g., LG Cologne, MedR 1995, 409 (410).
332. See Erwin Deutsch, Die Genomanalyse im Arbeits- und Sozialrecht - Ein Beitrag zum
genetischen Datenschutz, NZA, 657 (658), 1989; Jochen Taupitz, Privatrechtliche Rechtsposi-
tionen um die Genomanalyse: Eigentum, Persoenlichkeit, Leistung, JZ, 1089 (1092, 1094,
1098-1099), 1992.
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of his decision to permit the analysis. Then, after the examination, it would be
necessary to discuss the results with him. Furthermore, a patient would have
a constitutionally protected right to access and delivery of photocopies in his
medical files. This corresponds with the physician's duty not to disclose the
data to third persons, at least not until the data is anonymous. On the other
hand, a patient would be protected from information imposed on him, but to
which he does not want to have access (the so-called "right not to know").
3 3 3
Finally, a patient would be entitled to order the destruction of his medical files.
One should add that inasmuch as conclusions can be drawn from the ex-
amination of one person to another person's genetic constitution - one might
think of the case of the genetic analysis of a child, in which necessarily de-
tailed information about the genetic constitution of the parents becomes avail-
able - their own right of informational self-determination has to be
considered. Hence, an analysis of human substances must be forbidden until
all persons whose rights are affected by the examination have been consulted
and have consented.
The right to know one's heritage is substantially discussed in the area of
new assisted reproductive technologies as well. After a few scholars origi-
nally took the position that the interest of the donor to remain anonymous
would be so important that it should outweigh the child's interest to know their
heritage, 334 the majority since then has correctly held that the latter should
always prevail. 335  This view is based on the fact that the individual knowl-
edge about one's forbearers is of vital importance, not only in respect to the
realization of one's right to maintenance, 336 to avoid hereditary diseases, 337 or
to avoid later marriages between relatives, 338 and especially for the develop-
ment of one's personality and identity. 339 This is true because a parent-child
relationship does not end - like in many cases in the animal kingdom - with
333. See WOLFGANG VAN DEN DAELE, GENOMANALYSE, GENETISCHE TESTS UND
'SCREEBUBG' 15 (1985).
334. See Ernst Benda, Humangenetik und Recht - eine Zwischenbilanz, NJW, 1730, 1985;
Erwin Deutsch, Artifizielle Wege menschlicher Reproduktion: Rechtsgrundsaetze zur Kon-
servierung von Sperma, Eiern und Embryonen; kuenstliche Insemination und ausserkoerper-
liche Fertilisation; Embryotransfer, MDR, 177 (181), 1985.
335. See BARTOLD BUSSE, DAs RECHT DES KINDES AUF KENNTNIS SEINER ABSTAMMUNG BEI
HETEROLOGER KUENSTLICHER BEFRUCHTUNG (SAMENSPENDE, EISPENDE, EMBRYOSPENDE), EIN
BEIrRAG ZU DEN VERFASSUNGSRECHTLICHEN GRENZEN DER MODERNEN FORTPFLANZUNG-
SMEDIZIN 138 (1988).
336. According to Sec. 1601 German Civil Code, "relatives in direct line are obliged to
furnish maintenance to each other." Sec. 1589 states that "persons of whom one is the issue of
the other are related in direct line."
337. Hereditary diseases have been discussed in the context of: 1) Phenylketonuria (PKU),
see Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Article: Adoption, Reproductive Technologies, and Ge-
netic Information, 8 Health Matrix 125, 126, 133-34 (1998); 2) Leukemia, see id. at 143 and
Robertson, supra note 11, at 1016 n.260; 3) Kidney malfunction, see Robertson, supra note 11,
at 1016 n.260; 4) Heart disease, see Andrews & Elster supra note 177, at 146-47 and Cahn &
Singer, supra note 19, at 175; and 5) Cancer, see Cahn & Singer, supra note 19, at 175.
338. See BGHZ 82, 173 (177); BUSSE, supra note 335, at 18-19.
339. Cahn & Singer, supra note 19, at 173 et seq.
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the birth of the child, but continues in the child's lifetime. 340  On the other
hand, the parent-child-relationship does not start with birth, but does always
include the past as well.34 1
Due to these rationales, the usage of a so-called "sperm cocktail" is not
permitted in Germany.342  This prohibition is justified because the child
would thereafter be deprived of its possibilities to learn about its natural par-
ents. A negation of the child's right to have his father disclosed would be an
unjustified discrimination against a child who has been naturally procreated,
according to German law in Sec. 1600a Civil Code and in Sec. 640h Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provide the latter with such a right.
However, the general acknowledgement of this right does not identify
against whom a right to disclosure would be enforceable. A potential obligor
is the child's mother in case she herself knows the name of the donor. One
could argue that the idea expressed in Sec. 385 (1) No.2 Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which is an exemption to Sec. 383 (1) No.3 Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, would lead to the mother's obligation to disclose the donor's name.
This provision, however, is more accurately to be construed as not involving a
duty to disclose the circumstances of the acts of procreation themselves, i.e.
the mother is not obliged to disclose the father's name. Notwithstanding the
child's right to know its heritage, the mother's own sphere of intimacy is inso-
far of decisive importance. 3
43
Another person who may have a duty to disclose is the gynecologist who
conducts the artificial insemination. An interest to protect one's intimacy does
not exist in his case. Hence, one could only argue that the interests which
protect the mother from disclosure also protect the physician from disclosing
the donor's name. The gynecologist is only indirectly affected by the mother's
interests. Instead, he takes over an active part in the procreation of the child,
without which the child would not be born at all. Thus, his obligation to the
child should be more serious than possible obligations to the mother. The
gynecologist should be obliged to disclose the donor's name according to Sec.
242, 810 and 823 (1) Civil Code.344 An agreement between the physician and
the mother not to disclose the donor's name would be void under the law due
to a violation of the child's constitutionally protected right to know its heri-
tage. Despite the existence of provisions like Sec. 203 (1) No.1 Criminal
Code, Sec. 53 (1) No.3 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or Sec. 383 (1)
No.6 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the gynecologist does not have a right
to refuse to testify in court.
340. See Kurt Mueller, Zeugnispflicht bei heterologer Fertilisation, FamRZ 1986, 635.
341. See KARL JASPERS, PHILOSOPHIE 479 (1948).
342. See ADOLF LAUFS in: HANs-LUDWIG GUENTHER & ROLF KELLER, FORTPFLANZUNG-
SMEDIZIN UND HUMANGENETIK - STRAFRECHTLICHE SCHRANKEN? 102 (2nd ed. 1991).
343. BGHZ 82, 173 (174 et seq.); Deutsch, supra note 334, at 188.
344. Mueller, supra note 340, at 636; HELMUr NA", AERLICHEs BERUFSRECHT 177-78
(1973).
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2. United States
a. The Right to Know One's Heritage: Michael H. v. Gerald D.
345
The right to know one's heritage is not fully established in American case
law. The closest American Supreme Court case to the line of German Right to
Heritage cases is the following case, although the issue is the biological fa-
ther's right, rather than the children's right.
On May 9, 1976, in Las Vegas, Nevada, Carole D., an international
model, and Gerald D., a top executive in a French oil company, were married.
The couple established a home in Playa del Rey, California, in which they
resided together as husband and wife when one or the other was not out of the
country for business. In the summer of 1978, Carole became involved in an
adulterous affair with a neighbor, Michael H. In September 1980, she con-
ceived a child, Victoria D., who was born on May 11, 1981. Gerald was
listed as father on the birth certificate and has always held Victoria out to the
world as his daughter. Soon after delivery of the child, however, Carole in-
formed Michael that she believed he might be the father.
346
In the first three years of her life, Victoria remained with Carole, but
found herself within a variety of quasi-family units. In October 1981, Gerald
moved to New York City to pursue his business interests, but Carole chose to
remain in California. At the end of that month, Carole and Michael had blood
tests of themselves and Victoria, which showed a 98.07% probability that
Michael was Victoria's father. In January 1982, Carole visited Michael in St.
Thomas, where his primary business was based. There, Michael held Victoria
out as his child. In March, however, Carole left Michael and returned to Cali-
fornia to live with her husband.
347
Michael filed a filiation action in the Superior Court of California to es-
tablish his paternity and right to visitation. Gerald moved for summary judg-
ment on the ground that there were no triable issues of fact as to the child's
paternity. He relied on California Evidence Code Sec. 621, which contains a
presumption that the husband of the child's mother is a child's father,348 pro-
vided that the husband is neither sterile nor impotent. This presumption can
only be rebutted by the husband or the wife, and then only in limited circum-
stances. Michael challenged this statute as unconstitutional.
349
The Superior Court, finding enough evidence that the mother and her
husband had been cohabiting at the child's conception and birth and that Ger-
ald was neither sterile nor impotent, granted the husband's motion and rejected
the unconstitutionality challenges. The California Court of Appeals affirmed,
holding, inter alia, that (1) the conclusive presumption statute did not violate
345. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. The German Civil Code contains the same presumption in Sec. 1592 No.1.
349. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
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the rights of the putative father or the child under the due process clause of the
Federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment and (2) the statute did not vio-
late the child's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
clause.3
50
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a natural father can never
"have a constitutionally protected interest in his relationship with a child
whose mother was married to, and cohabiting with, another man at the time of
the child's conception and birth." 351 According to the Court, the conclusive
presumption statute did not infringe on the due process rights of the putative
father or the child, or on the child's equal protection rights. It reasoned, inter
alia, that (1) the putative father's procedural due process claim failed, because
the statute, although phrased in terms of a presumption, was the implementa-
tion of a substantive rule of law. 352 The Court then held that (2) the putative
father's substantive due process claim failed, because the power of a natural
father to claim paternity of a child born into a woman's existing marriage with
another man, and to assert parental rights over such a child, is not so deeply
embedded within society's traditions as to be a fundamental right qualifying as
a liberty interest;353 (3) the child had no due process right to maintain filial
relationships with both her putative father and her mother's husband; 354 and
lastly (4) the statute did not violate the child's equal protection rights insofar
as the statute denied the child, unlike her mother and her mother's husband,
the opportunity to rebut the presumption of paternity. 355 A number of concur-
ring 356 or dissenting357 opinions, however, indicated that a right to know one's
heritage might well exist.
b. The Right of Informational Self-determination: Whalen v. Roe
358
In 1972 the New York Legislature enacted a statute which classifies po-
tentially harmful drugs and provides that prescriptions for the most dangerous
legitimate drugs (Schedule II) be prepared on an official form. One copy of
the form, which identifies the prescribing physician, dispensing pharmacy,
drug and dosage, and patient's name, address and age, must be filed with a
central registry at the state Health Department. The Health Department logs
the forms, records the data on magnetic tapes for processing by a computer,
and then stores the forms in a room which is surrounded by a locked wire
fence and protected by an alarm system. The computer tapes are kept in a
350. Id.
351. See Justice Stevens' concurring opinion, 491 U.S. 110, 133 (1989).
352. Id. at 119.
353. Id. at 124-27.
354. Id. at 130-31.
355. Id. at 131.
356. Id at 132. (O'Connor, Kennedy and Stevens, J.J., concurring).
357. Id at 136. (Brennan, Marshall & Marshall, J.J., dissenting); id. at 157 (White and Bren-
nan, J.J. dissenting).
358. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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locked cabinet, and the computer is run "off-line" when the tapes are run, so
that no terminal outside the computer room can read or record any information
on the tapes. Public disclosure of the identities of patients is expressly prohib-
ited by the statute, except when disclosure is made: (1) to another person em-
ployed by the department; (2) pursuant to judicial subpoena or court order; (3)
to a government agency authorized to regulate a person who is authorized by
the statute to deal in controlled substances; or (4) to the central registry of the
Department.
359
A few days before the statute became effective, litigation was com-
menced by a group of patients regularly receiving prescriptions for Schedule II
drugs, by prescribing doctors, and by two associations of physicians. The
plaintiffs offered evidence tending to prove that people in need of Schedule II
drugs may decline such treatment because of a fear that the misuse of the
computerized data could cause them to be stigmatized as "drug addicts." The
District Court enjoined enforcement of the provisions of the statute dealing
with the reporting of patients' names and addresses, holding that the doctor-
patient relationship is a zone of privacy accorded constitutional protection and
that the identification provisions invaded that zone.
360
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the New York statute was "the
product of an orderly and rational legislative decision. '361 The Court ac-
knowledged the State's "vital interest in controlling the distribution of danger-
ous drugs. ' 362 It further acknowledged the existence of a constitutionally
protected right to privacy, consisting of the individual's interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters and the interest in independence in making cer-
tain kinds of important decisions. The court also noted "the mere existence in
readily available form of the information about patient's use of Schedule II
drugs creates a genuine concern that the information will become publicly
known and that it will adversely affect their reputations. ' 36 3 The Court was
persuaded, however, that the statute did not pose a "sufficiently grievous
threat" to either interest which could have established a violation of constitu-
tionally protected rights:36
4
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the
accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in com-
puterized data banks or other massive government files ...
much of which is personal in character and potentially embar-
rassing or harmful if disclosed .... Nevertheless New York's
statutory scheme, and its implementing administrative proce-
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 597.
362. Id. at 598.
363. Id. at 600.
364. Id.
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dures, evidence a proper concern with, and protection of, the
individual's interest in privacy.
365
c. The Conflict Between the Right of Informational Self-determination and
the Right to Know One's Heritage
i. Alma Society v. Mellon
366
The plaintiffs are adult adoptees and an association of such persons.
Under New York law, adoption records are to be sealed. Adopted persons -
upon reaching adulthood - are only permitted access to the files by "showing
of good cause." Plaintiffs filed suit to challenge the constitutionality of these
statutes, arguing that they should be constitutionally entitled to obtain their
sealed adoption records, including the names of their natural parents, without
the showing of any cause.
367
Plaintiffs' supporting affidavits indicated that lack of access to such
records caused some of them serious psychological trauma and pain and suf-
fering, may cause them or their children medical problems or misdiagnoses for
lack of history, may create in some persons a consciousness of a danger of
unwitting incest, and in others a "crisis" of religious identity or what they feel
is an impairment of religious freedom because they are unable to be reared in
the religion of their natural parents. Moreover, they cite a study indicating
that 128 out of 152 natural families selected at random agreed to meet an adult
adoptee.368  The District Court dismissed the complaint, finding the New
York laws to be constitutional. 369
The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision holding that,
because of the State's appropriate recognition of the privacy interests of the
natural and adoptive parents and the substantial promotion of important state
interests, neither the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion Clause, nor the Thirteenth Amendment would be violated. The Court
held that the "appellants' novel claims do not fit into any as yet recognized
category of 'privacy'," 370 and took into consideration that more interests than
the plaintiffs' were involved. Namely, those of "first, the natural parent(s)
who [have] surrendered custody of the adopte[d] child to the State and in turn
an agency or other family, and second, the adopting family which has, presum-
ably, nurtured the child to the age of adulthood. '371 Relying on two then
recent Supreme Court cases, Quilloin v. Walcott372 and Zablocki v. Redhail 37 3
365. Id. at 605.
366. Alma Soc. Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979).
367. Id.
368. See id. at 1233 note 13 (citing JONES, THE SEALED ADOrTION RECORD CONTROVERSY:
REPORT OF A SURVEY OF AGENCY POLICY, PRACTICE AND OPINION (1975)).
369. Id.
370. Id. at 1231.
371. Id.
372. Quillon v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
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the Court recognized that a state may consider all these conflicting interests,
and that the New York statutes did no more than to take these privacy interests
into account.374 The Court limited its holding, however, by recognizing that
"upon an appropriate showing of psychological trauma, medical need, or of a
religious identity crisis ... the New York courts would appear required under
their own statute to grant permission to release all or part of the sealed adop-
tion records. ' 3
75
ii. Doe v. Sundquist
37 6
In 1995, the Tennessee Legislature enacted several statutory provisions
and amendments regarding the law of adoption. Section 36-1-127(c) of the
new law, which became effective July 1, 1996, provides in relevant part: "(1)
(A) All adoption records ... shall be made available to the following eligible
persons: (i) an adopted person ... who is twenty-one (21) years of age or older
... ; (ii) the legal representative of [such] a person... ; (B) Information ...
shall be released ... only to the parents, siblings, lineal descendants, or lineal
ancestors, of the adopted person.. . , and only with the express written con-
sent ... [of] the adopted person . . . ,,377 The new law also provides for a
"contact veto," under which a parent, sibling, spouse, lineal ancestor, or lineal
descendant may register to prevent contact by the adopted person.378 A viola-
tor of the "contact veto" is subject to civil and criminal liability.
379
A group of plaintiffs, consisting of both biological parents who had sur-
rendered their children for adoption, adoptive parents and a non-profit child-
placing agency, challenged the constitutionality of the new law in the federal
as well as in the Tennessee state courts, alleging, inter alia, a violation of their
right to procreate and their right of informational self-determination. The
plaintiffs' suits were unsuccessful in both jurisdictions.
380
In regard to the plaintiff's contention that open adoption records were
violating their rights under the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial of the plaintiff's mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction, reasoning that the Tennessee legislature had
made
a serious attempt to weigh and balance two frequently con-
flicting interests: the interest of the child adopted at an early
age to know who that child's parents were, an interest entitled
373. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
374. 601 F.2d 1225, 1233 (1979).
375. Id. at 1233.
376. 106 F.3d 702 (1997), cert. denied, U.S. 118 S. Ct. 51, 139 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1997), 2 S.W.
3d 919 (1999).
377. TENN. CODE ANN. sec. 36-1-128 (1996 & Supp. 1998).
378. Id.
379. TENN. CODE ANN. sec. 36-1-132 (1996 & Supp. 1998).
380. 106 F.3d 702 (1997), cert. denied, U.S. 118 S. Ct. 51, 139 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1997), 2 S.W.
3d 919 (1999).
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to a good deal of respect and sympathy, and the interests of
birth parents in the protection of the integrity of a sound adop-
tion system.
381
The Court said it was "powerless to disturb this resolution" 382 since the
Constitution did not elevate the right to avoid disclosure of adoption records
above the right to know the identity of one's parents. 383 It found the plain-
tiffs' right to procreate not to be relevant for the case at hand, as the chal-
lenged law did not limit adoptions. 384 In respect to the plaintiffs' alleged right
to avoid disclosure of confidential information, the Court answered that such a
right "has not been fleshed out by the Supreme Court" and would run counter
to their decisions in J.P. v. DeSanti,385 Doe v. Sundquist,3 8 6 and Doe v.
Wiggington .387
Similarly, evaluating the constitutionality of the law under the Tennessee
Constitution, the Tennessee Supreme Court held open adoption records to be
lawful. 388 The Court found the decision of whether to carry a pregnancy to
term to be fundamentally different from the decision of whether to surrender a
child for adoption, 389 and held that the confidentiality of records was a statu-
tory matter left to the legislature. 390  Said the Court:
The disclosure provisions reflect the legislature's determina-
tion that allowing limited access to adoption records is in the
best interest of both adopted persons and the public. The
provisions do not, however, allow unfettered access in disre-
gard of the sensitivities and privacy interests involved. To
the contrary, disclosure is limited to an adopted individual or
that individual's legal representative, 21 years of age or older.
Moreover, extensive provisions are included to allow a birth
parent or other related individual to register a "contact veto"
and eliminate or reduce the risk that disclosure of identifying
information will have a disruptive effect upon the lives of the
biological and adoptive families .... Absent a fundamental
right or other compelling reason, we reject the invitation to
expand constitutional protection to the non-disclosure of per-
sonal information.
391
381. 106 F.3d 702, 707 (1997).
382. Id.
383. Id. at 705.
384. Id. at 706.
385. 653 F.2d 1080 (6' Cir. 1981).
386. 21 F.3d 733 (60' Cir. 1994).
387. 106 F.3d 702, 706 (1997).
388. Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W. 3d 919, 927 (1999).
389. Id. at 926.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 926.
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d. Discussion
These cases illustrate the point that neither a right to know one's heritage,
nor a right of informational self-determination are yet recognized by the ma-
jority of the American courts and many scholars. 392 The idea of such privacy
rights yielding information has gained more weight on the state level, as the
recent discussion about the adoption record cases shows.393 Adoption records
along with the adoptee's original birth certificate have traditionally been
sealed in the United States, i.e. closed not only to the general public, but also
to all adoptees and their parents.394 A new birth certificate is issued which
substitutes the adoptive parents' name for that of the biological parents, pro-
claiming that the adoptee is the adoptive parents' child.395 Children could get
access to information only if they could demonstrate "good cause," 396 a term
which is only defined in Virginia 397 and involves a balancing of the best inter-
ests of the adoptee with the interests of the adoptive and birth parents.
398
Over the past twenty years, however, a number of states have established
different procedures that allow contact between adoptees and their genetic rel-
atives if certain prerequisites are met. Three different approaches can be dis-
tinguished: First, more than twenty states have enacted some form of mutual
consent registry, i.e. they allow persons who are directly involved in the adop-
tion procedure to register their consent to meet and, to a certain degree, ex-
change information. 399 In some states, it is enough that one parent agrees, 4° °
whereas in others mutual consent of the biological parents is necessary for
releasing identifying information.40 1 Although Congress has repeatedly con-
sidered the creation of a national mutual consent registry, 4° 2 these considera-
tions have been fruitless to date such that mutual consent registries still
operate at the individual state level only. 4° 3
392. See also Cahn & Singer, supra note 19, at 161 note 50; Claudine R. Reiss, Comment:
The Fear of Opening Pandora's Box: The Need to Restore Birth Parents' Privacy Rights in the
Adoption Process, 28 Sw. U. L. Rev. 133, 142, 145 et seq. (1998).
393. See Cahn & Singer, supra note 19, at 153 et seq.
394. Cahn & Singer, supra note 19, at 154; Reiss, supra note 392, at 137.
395. Id.
396. Andrews & Elster, supra note 337, at 137 et seq.; Cahn & Singer, supra note 19, at 154.
397. VA. CODE ANN. sec. 63.1-236 (Michie 1995) (defining the term "good cause" as "a
showing of a compelling and necessitous need for identifying information").
398. See Andrews & Elster, supra note 337, at 136-37 et seq.
399. See Andrews & Elster, supra note 337, at 147 note 107; Cahn & Singer, supra note 19,
at 162 et seq.
400. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, sec. 50 (Law. Co-op. 1994); 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. sec. 2905 (1998).
401. E.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH sec. 4138-d (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1998).
402. See Cahn & Singer, supra note 19, at 163 n.59. Senator Carl Levin has advocated the
enactment of legislation to establish a federal mutual consent registry since 1980. The legisla-
tion has passed the Senate several times, but has never passed the House. The House Ways and
Means Subcommittee recently held hearings to consider the registry.
403. Cahn & Singer, supra note 19, at 163.
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Secondly, more than fifteen states have opted for so-called "search and
consent" procedures. Under these procedures, a state becomes a "confidential
intermediary" with an affirmative obligation to search for and request consent
from the adoptive parents for the release of identifying information if an
adoptee or biological parents requests so.4°4 If the adoptive parents decline to
give their consent, the adoptee can still petition the court to open the adoption
records under the traditional good cause standard.40 5 The "confidential inter-
mediary" approach has found some support by the courts as well.406
Finally, a few states have opted for completely open records. Two
states, Alaska4 7 and Kansas, 4° 8 allow adult adoptees - without any judicial
or administrative hearing, but based merely on a request - access to their
original birth certificates. Other states, namely Minnesota,
40 9 Washington, 4 10
Vermont,4 1 1 Delaware, 4 12 Oregon,413 and, as seen in Doe v. Sundquist,4 14 Ten-
nessee,415 have adopted statutes which differ in detail, but are all "open
records statutes."
None of these concepts is completely satisfactory, however. The mutual
consent registries, for example, have typically been understaffed as well as
underfunded and thus have had difficulties in publicizing their existence as
well as in matching registrants.4 16  The "confidential intermediary system,"
on the other hand, is even more expensive than the mutual consent regis-
tries,4 17 and includes conditions that restrict their use.41 8  Under both ap-
proaches, there has been criticism by the registrants due to a "lack of
control. '4 19 The reasons why a truly open adoption record system is problem-
404. See Andrews & Elster, supra note 337, at 148-49; Cahn & Singer, supra note 19, at
165-66.
405. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §. 259.89 (3) (6) (West Supp. 1998).
406. See Golan v. Louise Wise Serv., 507 N.E.2d 275, 279 (N.Y. 1987).
407. See ALASKA STAT. §18.50.500 (Michie 1998).
408. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §65-2423 (Supp. 1998).
409. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §259.89(b) (West 1998).
410. See WASH. REV. CODE §26.33.345 (1997).
411. See VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 15A, §6-105(b) (2) (Supp. 1998).
412. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §923 (Supp. 1998).
413. See Cahn & Singer, supra note 19, at 168. On November 3, 1998, Oregon voters
passed a ballot initiative that allows adoptees to receive their original birth certificates in the
same manner as any other person. This initiative was blocked from becoming law, however, by
a preliminary injunction of an Oregon trial court.
414. See id. at 172-173.
415. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36 - 1 - 1 - 127 (c) (1996 & Supp. 1998).
416. See Alan W. Strasser, Adoption Search and Registry Laws of Vermont and New York:
Whose Best Interest is Being Served, 28 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 669, 688 (1994); See Calm &
Singer, supra note 19, at 164.
417. See Cahn & Singer, supra note 19, at 165.
418. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §7508-1.3 (c) (1) (Supp. 1998). For example, the Oklahoma
registry is unavailable to an adult adoptee who knows of a minor biological sibling, Moreover,
an adoptee can only apply after she has been registered with the state's mutual consent registry
for at least six months, See D. Marianne Brower Blair, The New Oklahoma Adoption Code: A
Quest to Accommodate Diverse Interests, 33 Tulsa L.J. 177, 254 (1997).
419. See Cahn & Singer, supra note 19, at 166.
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atic have been pointed out in Doe v. Sundquist and also include the danger of
promoting "genetic essentialism," i.e., the view that human beings are merely
the sum of their genes.
42 0
In addition to all these reasons, the policy arguments remain which have
traditionally been made for sealed adoption records. Offering the child the
opportunity to begin its life without the stigma of illegitimacy;42' giving the
child the chance to become part of a family which desperately wants a child
and can care for 1,422 securing the adoptive family's life from intrusion by the
birth parents or the public,42 3 enabling the birth parents to erase a traumatic
past and to "move on and attempt to rebuild their lives,' 42 4 and reducing the
likelihood of natural parents resorting to abortions or to the black market.
42 5
However, the trend to a more open adoption policy on the state level has
to be welcomed. Traditional sealed record laws have not given appropriate
weight to the child's need to gain information about his heritage, a need that is
essential to that person's identity and self-image 426 and to avoid genetic dis-
eases.427  Scientific studies have evidenced that many adoptees suffer from
"genealogical bewilderment ' 42 8 and that adoptees account for a disproportion-
ate percentage of total psychiatric patients.429 Moreover, one has to consider
that the new statutes limit the child's access to his records by requiring a mini-
mum age, and arguably, by this time, the other parties' rights have become
less serious in the meantime. As Naomi Cahn and Jana Singer have pointed
out:
Focusing on the concept of identity, and particular on its fluid-
ity, suggests that the appropriate solution to the adoption
records controversy is one that allows for change over time.
At the time a birth parent relinquishes a child for adoption, it
is that parent's identity that is most salient . . . . As an
420. See Andrews & Elster, supra note 337, at 149-151; Cahn & Singer, supra note 19, at
184 et seq.
421. See In re Anonymous, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779, 781 (Supr. Ct. 1976); Mills v. Atlantic City
Dept. of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 649 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977); Cahn & Singer,
supra note 19, at 155.
422. Reiss, supra note 392, at 138.
423. See Sarah E. Nugent, The Release of Nonidentifying Information to Adopted Children:
Striking a Balance Between the Rights of Biological Parents and Adopted Children, 23 Rutgers
L.J. 709, 713 (1992).
424. See Joel D. Tenenbaum, Introducing the Uniform Adoption Act, 30 Fam. L.Q. 333, 340-
41 (1966); Andrews & Elster, supra note 337, at 140.
425. See Carol Chumney, Current Trends in Tennessee Family Law: Tennessee's New Adop-
tion Contact Veto is Cold Comfort to Birth Parents, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 843, 871 (1997);
Andrews & Elster, supra note 337, at 141; Reiss, supra note 392, at 139.
426. See Reiss, supra note 392, at 142.
427. See supra note 337 and accompanying text.
428. See In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 767 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
429. See SOROsKY et al., Tan ADOPTION TRIANGLE: THE EI-EcT OF SEALED RECORDS ON
ADOPTEES, BIRTH PARENTS, AND ADOPTIVE PARENrs 30, 96 (1978); see also Mills v. Atlantic
City Dept. of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 654-55 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
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adopted child matures, however, and the birth parent's relin-
quishment recedes in time, the child's identity should begin to
predominate. By the time the child reaches the age of major-
ity, the child's need to construct her identity interests out-
weigh the birth parent's earlier desire to prevent the
establishment of a parent-child relationship. Moreover, the
child's status as an adult diminishes any claim a birth parent
may have to make decisions on behalf of the child.
430
On the other hand, completely open adoption records bear the risk that
the parents' right of informational self-determination or right to confidentiality
as the "individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters" 431 may
be left without protection. Leaving the parents without these protections
would run afoul with their importance for human personality.
In sum, the approach that uses "confidential intermediaries" seems best
suited to balance the rights of all parties involved in the adoption process.
Moreover, non-identifying information could be provided to the adoptive par-
ents at the time of the adoption, including information like medical history and
ethnic background. 432 Today, at least twelve states require a compilation of a
social history if obtainable;433 thirty-four require a medical history;434 twenty-
four require a genetic history or history of hereditary conditions; 435 and
twenty-one require a health history. 436 The Uniform Adoption Act provides
for the release of non-identifying medical and other relevant information to the
adoptive parents prior to the adoption.437  This kind of information might in
many cases be sufficient to give the child the opportunity to develop a self-
identity and to avoid inheritable diseases, without intruding too far into the
biological parents' privacy rights. 438 One commentator has drafted a possible
provision which would reflect these considerations. 4
39
Finally, the discussion about adoption records is very useful for the com-
parable discussion about privacy rights in the artificial insemination context.
For the child, the need to discover its biological origins in this area is as im-
430. Cahn & Singer, supra note 19, at 174-75; see also SOROSKY supra note 430, at 90-91.
431. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).
432. See PAUL SACHDEV, UNLOCKING THE ADOPTION FILES 92 (1989); Nugent, supra note
423, at 718; Reiss, supra note 392, at 153.




437. See UNIF. ADoPTION ACT §2-106, 9 U.L.A. 17 (Supp. 1999); see also Carrie L.
Wambaugh, Comment: Biology is Important, But Does Not Necessarily Always Constitute a
"Family": A Brief Survey of the Uniform Adoption Act, 32 Akron L. Rev. 791, 815 (1999).
438. Reiss, supra note 392 at 153.
439. Id. at 154-55.
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portant as in the adoption context." 0 Sperm donors may later regret not hav-
ing contact with their biological children and thus suffer similar symptoms as
women who have surrendered their child for adoption and are haunted by con-
cem about the well-being of the child.44 Notwithstanding these facts, sperm
donors have traditionally been promised anonymity by infertility clinics or
under state law.
442
Similarly, Sec. 5 (a) of the Uniform Parentage Act provides that all docu-
ments relating to an artificial insemination "shall be kept confidential and in a
sealed file" and that they are "subject to inspection only upon an order of the
court for good cause shown."'443  The abovementioned procedures, however,
in the adoption context may be transferred into the context of assisted repro-
duction and implemented by infertility clinics to give the child's privacy rights
greater weight. One good example which has been implemented by a clinic is
the Sperm Bank of California's "Yes" donor program in which sperm donors
can consent to have their identities disclosed to their biological children upon
a child's request when the child becomes of age."4
Similarly, courts may soon have to answer the request of a child, con-
ceived with donor gametes, to have access to the records disclosing his genetic
parents' identities, and may then use a "confidential intermediary" to protect
the privacy rights of the parties involved,445 or at least provide the child with
some non-identifying information at a certain age.446  Moreover, the collec-
tion, compilation and disclosure of personal data will lead to the same con-
440. See Jeanne Marie Laskas, Left Unsaid, Wash. Post Mag., Mar. 29, 1998, at W35; Bar-
bara Vobejda, Egg Donation: A Growing Business; Fertility Successes Raise Demand, Price,
Wash. Post, Mar. 7, 1999, at A7.
441. See Robertson, supra note 11, at 1016; Cahn & Singer, supra note 19, have empha-
sized, however, that, while similar policy arguments could support openness in the context of
sperm and egg donors, there would be "some differences" in the context of sperm and egg
donors which would make them "much more difficult than claims to adoption records." Id. at
172-73. They have pointed out that "issues of "relinquishment" or "abandonment" may be far
less complex; "giving up" sperm or an egg may be far more comprehensible to a child than is
"giving up" a baby. Thus, "donor" children may have fewer psychological issues surrounding
their origins, and knowing the identity of their genetic parents may be less central to their sense
of self. Even these children, however, sometimes express strong interest in meeting their biolog-
ical relatives .... For gamete donors, the issues are similarly complex. Like birth parents after
adoption, gamete donors lack a legal relationship with their "children." However, unlike a
gamete donor, a birth mother who relinquishes a child for adoption has carried and nurtured that
child for nine months of pregnancy. The issues may also be different for male and female
donors; like many biological fathers, sperm donors seem far less troubled by anonymity than
some egg donors, who have undergone more invasive procedures and may have created a bond
with the recipient family. Additionally, male donors are capable of "fathering" many more
children than are female donors." Id. at 188-89.
442. See Andrews & Elster, supra note 337, at 138; Cahn & Singer, supra note 19, at 188.
443. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §5, 9B U.L.A. 296, 301-302 (1987 & Supp. 1990).
444. See Seligson, Seeds of Doubt, Atlantic Monthly, March 1995, at 28; Andrews & Elster,
supra note 337, at 148-49.
445. See Andrews & Elster, supra note 337, at 149.
446. See Robertson, supra note 11, at 1017 n.266.
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flicts as in the adoption records context.447 Elaborate "go-between systems"
with the involvement of various intermediaries which make sure that a sperm
source will never learn who received his sperm44' - often requested by les-
bian couples undergoing assisted reproduction to guarantee that the sperm do-
nor will under no circumstances have access to the child 44 9 - are highly
problematic.
3. Comparison
By reasoning that intimate information reflects human personality, be-
cause it is an important component of both the inner person and the public
persona,450 the German Constitutional and Supreme Court have extended de-
grees of protection over personal data, 451 honor, rights to one's good name,
452
portrayal of self,4 53 image,454 and spoken word.455 It has already been pointed
out that cases like the Census case proffer a "sensible way to preserve the
inviolability of personhood and human freedom amidst dramatic technological
change. '456  These doctrines are not (yet) part of American constitutional
law.4 57 However, American law should develop similar rights of informa-
tional self-determination. 458 The recent trend in America shows that courts
are beginning to give more and more weight to these privacy rights.
4 59
On the other hand, the American concept of using a "confidential inter-
mediary" and the disclosure of certain non-identifying information could serve
as a model for determining the privacy rights in the assisted reproduction con-
text in Germany. If accompanied by appropriate procedural safeguards
against misuse, the "confidential intermediary" model seems capable of pro-
viding artificially procreated children with the information they need for the
development of their personality without depriving the genetic parents of their
own privacy rights. The effectiveness of the concept could be enhanced by
adopting a provision which gives the child a right to petition a court to open
the reproductive file in case of the genetic parents' rejection of their consent if
the opening of the record seems appropriate under the particular circumstances
of the case. The judge could then use discretion to balance the parties' inter-
ests on a case-by-case basis.
447. See Andrews & Elster, supra note 337, at 135-36.
448. See Robertson, supra note 11, at 1007 n.229 (citing Davies, Artificial Insemination in
WOMEN AND THE LAW 8-1, 8-21-8-22 (C.H. Lefcourt ed. 1984)).
449. See Robertson, supra note 11, at 1007 n.229.
450. See BVerfGE 65, 1, 42-43.
451. BVerfGE 65, 1.
452. BVerfGE 30, 173.
453. BVerfGE 34, 269.
454. BVerfGE 35, 202.
455. BVerfGE 54, 208.
456. Eberle, supra note 7, at 1055.
457. Id. at 1051.
458. Id. at 1055.
459. See Dolgin, supra note 17, at 227.
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C. The Right to Enter Into Surrogacy Contracts
1. Germany
In general, German contract law is dominated by the principle of freedom
of contract (Vertragsfreiheit).460  Thus, there can be no doubt that the ability
to enter into all kinds of contractual agreements is part of the general right to
personality (allgemeine Handlungsfreiheit) protected under Art. 2 (1) of the
German Constitution. 46' This freedom is not unlimited, however. Sec. 134
Civil Code states that a legal transaction which violates a statutory prohibition
is void. Moreover, according to Sec. 138 (1) Civil Code, the same is true if a
transaction violates public policy.
With respect to surrogacy contracts, the German courts have held that
such contracts are to be considered unconscionable. 462  Moreover, the Ger-
man legislature enacted the Embryonenschutzgesetz (Act for the Protection of
Embryos) on December 13, 1990, which in Sec. 1 (1) expressly prohibits sur-
rogacy,463 and imposes criminal sanctions for violations. 464  Thus, all surro-
gacy contracts in Germany are void under Sec. 134, 138 Civil Code.
2. United States
Unlike the German situation, the American case law dealing with the
right to enter into surrogacy agreements is highly controversial.
a. Surrogate Parenting Associates v. Kentucky ex rel. Armstrong
465
The Surrogate Parenting Association ('SPA') was a medical clinic in the
business of arranging for surrogates to have children for couples. The surro-
gate, procured by the SPA, was artificially fertilized with sperm from the hus-
band of the couple. Under the surrogate contract, the surrogate would then
forfeit her parental rights, leaving the infertile wife free to adopt the child.
The surrogate was provided with all her pregnancy expenses and attorney fees
and received compensation, a portion of which was paid prior to giving birth,
with the remainder due after the termination of the surrogate's parental rights.
SPA received a fee for its procurement services in addition to being paid for
460. OrrO PALANDT, BUERGERLICHES GESETZBUCH, KOMMENTAR Sec. 145 n.7 (58th ed.
1999).
461. See, e.g., BVerfGE 8, 274 (328); INGO VON MUENCH (PUBLISHER), GG-KMMENTAR,
BAND 1 (4th ed. 1992), Art.2 n.16.
462. PALANDT, supra note 460, at Sec.138 n.48; Harrer, supra note 11, at 123 n.203.
463. See PALANDT, supra note 460, at Einf v Sec. 1591 n.31; in addition, the German Adop-
tionsvermittlungs-gesetz (Act for the Brokerage of Adoptions) prohibits the brokerage in regard
to surrogates, See id. at Sec. 138 n.48.
464. See Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, The Process of Regulating Assisted Reproductive Tech-
nologies: What We Can Learn From Our Neighbors - What Translates and What Does Not, 45
Loy. L. Rev. 247, n.98 (1999). See also Dolgin, supra note 17, at 225 n.2.
465. 704 S.W. 2d 209 (Ky. 1986).
2002]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
the performance of the artificial fertilization and obstetric care for the
surrogate.
466
Under Kentucky law, any agreement made by a birth mother to surrender
custody during the five days following birth was voidable. The SPA contracts
permit the surrogate to change her mind and void the contract during these five
days. The Attorney General of the State of Kentucky brought suit to invali-
date the corporate charter of the SPA. The District Court found for the SPA,
but the decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
467
The Kentucky Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's decision.
468 It
held that the SPA was not in violation of any existing Kentucky law. The
court distinguished the abovementioned surrogacy procedure from a contract
to sell a baby on the grounds that the surrogacy agreement took place prior to
insemination. 469 Moreover, the court held that since the Kentucky legislature
had explicitly sanctioned the IVF process, it had put its "stamp of approval"
on "tampering with nature in the interest of assisting a childless couple to
conceive. '470 The court emphasized that the agreement was in fact voidable
during the first five days after birth, and refused to label the SPA's activities as
illegal without clearer guidance from Kentucky's legislature.471
b. In re Baby M.472
William Stern and his wife entered into an agreement with Mary Beth
Whitehead for her to gestate a baby and subsequently release it to them for
adoption. Ms. Whitehead's consideration was to receive a fee of $10,000.
She was artificially fertilized with the husband's semen, became pregnant, and
delivered Baby M. After birth, however, she changed her mind and claimed
custody rights of her child. The biological father, on the other hand, argued
that his right to procreate entitled him to enforcement of the contract. The trial
court upheld the surrogacy contract as a valid contract, terminated Ms. White-
head's parental rights, granted sole custody to the child to Mr. Stern and per-
mitted Mrs. Stern to adopt Baby M.
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the decision in part and re-
versed in part.47 3 The court held surrogate contracts conflict with New Jersey
statutes which 1) prohibit the use of money in connection with adoptions; 2)
require proof of abandonment or parental unfitness before a court may order
termination of parental rights or an adoption is granted; and 3) make the sur-
render of custody and consent to adoption irrevocable. 474 In addition, surro-
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Id. at 214.
469. Id. at 211.
470. Id. at 212.
471. Id. at 214.
472. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
473. Id. at 1264.
474. Id. at 1240-46.
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gacy agreements were against New Jersey public policy.475 Regarding Mr.
Stem's right to procreate, the court held that the custody, care, companionship,
and nurturing that follow birth were not parts of this right.476 The court went
on to balance the parties' competing interests, holding that a biological fa-
ther's right to procreate cannot extend so far as to deprive the biological
mother of her own right to procreation.4 77 The court did, however, affirm the
District Court's order awarding custody to Mr. Stem as being in the best inter-
est of the child.478  The case was remanded to determine visitation rights
because the trial court was precluded from making a determination on that
issue.
479
c. Johnson v. Calvert
480
Crispina and Mark Calvert, a married couple, were unable to have a child
without medical assistance, because Ms. Calvert's uterus had been removed in
1984. In 1989, Anna Johnson, a co-worker of Ms. Calvert, offered to serve
the Calverts as a gestational surrogate. The parties entered into a surrogacy
contract according to which Ms. Johnson would gestate an embryo created
from Crispina's and Mark's gametes and would give birth to the resulting
child. Ms. Johnson promised that, at the birth of the baby, she would surren-
der her maternal rights to the Calverts. The contract further provided that Ms.
Johnson would receive a $10,000 fee in a series of installments. After six
months of her pregnancy, Ms. Johnson told the Calverts that unless they would
pay the entire balance due she would refuse to surrender the above-mentioned
rights. As a result, the parties ended up in court a number of months before
the baby Christopher, was born in September 1990. Ms. Johnson argued that
an obligation to surrender her maternal rights would deprive her of her consti-
tutional right to the companionship of her child. The Calverts, on the other
hand, emphasized their constitutional interests as the child's natural parents in
regard to their procreative choices and their relationship with their child.
481
The trial court held that the Calverts were the "legal" parents of Christo-
pher, because Crispina was the child's "genetic, biological, and natural
mother," while Ms. Johnson was but a "gestational carrier," a "host," and a
"genetic hereditary stranger" to the child, comparable to a foster parent and a
wet nurse. Similarly, although relying on state statutory law based on the
Uniform Parentage Act, the California Court of Appeals found that Ms. Cal-
vert's genetic connection to the child constituted her "natural" maternity, and
held that the "legal" mother of a child is its "natural" mother.482
475. Id. at 1246-50.
476. Id. at 1253.
477. Id. at 1254.
478. Id. at 1256-61.
479. Id. at 1261-64.
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The California Supreme Court affirmed, but on entirely different grounds.
It reasoned that neither the parties' biological relationships to the child, nor
state statutory law would provide clear guidance. 48 3  The intentions of the
parties to parent, as manifested by the surrogacy contract, should govern.
48 4
The court concluded:
Although the Act recognizes both genetic consanguinity and
giving birth as means of establishing a mother and child rela-
tionship, when the two means do not coincide in one woman,
she who intended to procreate the child - that is, she who
intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to
raise as her own - is the natural mother under California
law.4
85
d. In re Marriage of Moschetta486
Cynthia Moschetta, sixteen years Robert Moschetta's senior and already
a mother when she married him at the age of 40, previously had a tubal liga-
tion. She was unlikely to have more (biological) children, but a number of
years after their marriage they decided that they wanted children. They un-
successfully attempted fertility treatment, and then, in 1989, turned to surro-
gacy. A surrogacy broker introduced the Moschettas to Elvira Jordan. The
parties negotiated a surrogacy agreement without the advice of counsel. Ms.
Jordan agreed to be artificially fertilized with Robert's semen, to gestate and
give birth to the resulting baby, to then terminate her maternity rights, and
finally assist in the adoption process that would declare Cynthia Moschetta the
child's legal mother. Jordan was to receive $10,000 as consideration. The
artificial insemination was performed privately and without medical
assistance.4
87
Before the birth of baby Marissa in May 1990, the Moschetta marriage
began to deteriorate, and a divorce was considered. Ms. Jordan, learning of
the Moschettas' marital problems while still pregnant, reconsidered the surro-
gacy contract. Shortly after the baby was born, Ms. Moschetta went to court
to seek a dissolution of her marriage and parental rights to and custody of
Marissa.488
The trial court held that Elvira Jordan and Robert Moschetta were the
parents of Marissa pursuant to the surrogacy contract and granted them joint
483. Id. at 781.
484. Id. at 782.
485. Id.
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legal and physical custody. Ms. Moschetta then filed a brief with the Court of
Appeals supporting the trial court's declaration of Elvira's maternity.
489
Robert, however, continued to argue for Cynthia Moschetta's legal moth-
erhood. In order to preclude Ms. Jordan's maternity and his having to share
custody of Marissa with Elvira, he cited Johnson v. Calvert,490 which held that
the intent of the parties as manifested by the surrogacy agreement shall be
decisive. He referred to California Evidence Code Sec. 621 and California
Civil Code Sec. 7015, and relied on the argument that Cynthia "received" the
child into her home and thus, on equal protection grounds, be deemed the
mother.
49 1
The California Court of Appeals rejected all of Mr. Moschetta's argu-
ments. As to his reliance on Johnson v. Calvert, the court responded that, in
the absence of natural maternity, a woman could only establish a mother-child
relationship by complying with the procedures which are outlined in the state
adoption laws of California and that the contract at issue did not substitute for
compliance with these laws. 492 In other words, the Court premised maternity
on either natural procreation or adoption, and further limited "natural" procre-
ation to women with some biological connection to the child involved.
493
e. In re Marriage of Buzzanca
494
Similar to Moschetta, this case involved a surrogacy contract between the
intending parents, a married couple, Luanne and John Buzzanca, and a surro-
gate, Pamela Snell. As in Moschetta, the marriage of the intending parents
deteriorated and was dissolved before the child was born. However, in Buz-
zanca neither intending parent was a genetic parent to the baby, Jaycee, who
was born in 1995. Rather, Pamela had become pregnant through the use of an
embryo created from the semen and ova of anonymous donors at a Californian
infertility clinic.
A couple of months after the child's birth, Luanne Buzzanca, who had
brought the baby home from the hospital, sought child support from John as
part of the action to dissolve their marriage. John denied paternity duties,
although he admitted that he had signed the surrogacy agreement. However,
he argued that because he signed the surrogacy contract after the baby's con-
ception, he was not a party to the contract. Luanne then sought a judicial
declaration of John's natural parentage. The trial court found that neither John
nor Luanne was a lawful parent of Jaycee, but declared her a child without
489. Id.
490. See supra notes 295-296.
491. Id.
492. In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 900 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
493. See Dolgin, supra note 17, at 244.
494. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998).
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parentage. Luanne's potential maternity was made dependent on her willing-
ness and ability to comply with state adoption procedures.
495
The Court of Appeals reversed.496 The court emphasized the fact that
Jaycee never would have been born had not John and Luanne agreed to have a
fertilized egg implanted in Pamela Snell, the surrogate. 497 The court went on
to say that establishing natural parentage under the law need not depend on
proof of any biological relation between mother and child, because public pol-
icy would favor, whenever possible, the establishment of legal parenthood
with the concomitant responsibility. 498 The court grounded Luanne's mater-
nity first on California's statutory scheme for regulating parentage in cases of
artificial reproduction, and second, on an expansive reading of Johnson v. Cal-
vert.499 The court defined Ms. Buzzanca's consent as constituting a basis on
which to premise her maternity and treated the consent as the legal equivalent
to a genetic or gestational link between putative mothers and children in other
cases. 500
f. R.R. v. M.H.50
1
In November 1996, Robert and Margaret Rascoe, wishing to have a bio-
logical child, but unable to procreate due to Margaret's infertility, entered into
a contract with Michelle Hoagland, a surrogate. New England Surrogate
Parenting Advisors arranged the terms of the surrogacy for a fee of $6,000.
According to the agreement, Hoagland was to receive $10,000 to conceive,
gestate, and bear a child created from her ova and Robert's semen. The surro-
gate further promised that she would surrender custody to Robert and his wife
at the child's birth. The agreement, however, did not provide for the termina-
tion of Michelle's maternity, but only for her relinquishing custody of any
child who would be born as a result of the contract. Hoagland became preg-
nant in 1996, but informed the Rascoes, before the child's birth in August
1997, that she had decided to retain custody of the child upon its birth. She
returned part of the money paid to her.50 2
Robert Rascoe filed suit to have his paternity declared and to establish his
rights under the surrogacy contract. A Massachusetts state court granted tem-
porary custody of the child to the Rascoes. Hoagland received the right to




496. Id. at 293-94.
497. Id. at 288.
498. Id. at 290.
499. See supra notes 295-296.
500. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 288-90 (Ct. App. 1998).




THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The Massachusetts Supreme Court, in light of public policy concerns and
state adoption laws, refused to validate the compensated surrogacy agree-
ment. 504 Under Massachusetts' adoption law, a woman is not allowed to pro-
vide binding consent to terminate her parental rights with a view toward
adoption of her child by some other party earlier than the fourth day after the
child's birth.50 5  In addition, the law prohibits payments to a birth mother
beyond expenses of birth.506 Finally, Massachusetts law does not provide for
private adoptions. 507
The Court further declined to rely on Massachusetts' artificial insemina-
tion law as a model for deciding whether to approve of traditional surrogacy,
as the situation of a sperm donor was held to be distinguishable from that of a
surrogate mother on the grounds that surrogate motherhood is never anony-
mous and the surrogate's commitment and contribution was "unavoidably
much greater" than that of a sperm donor.
50 8
g. Kass v. Kass
5 °9
Maureen and Steve Kass married in 1988. In 1989, the couple sought,
due to Maureen's exposure in utero diethylstilbestrol (DES), medical help to
conceive a child. Between 1990 and 1993, the Kasses unsuccessfully at-
tempted in vitro fertilization (IVF) ten times at a Long Island infertility clinic,
which amounted to costs of more than $75,000.00. However, the clinic was
successful in fertilizing nine ova during the last IVF procedure in May 1993.
Physicians then implanted four of the fertilized ova in the uterus of Maureen's
sister, Eileen, who had agreed to serve as a gestational surrogate. The remain-
ing five embryos were cryopreserved. Eileen did not become pregnant. In
July, eight weeks after the IVF procedure and cryopreservation, Maureen insti-
tuted a divorce action, asking for "sole custody" of the frozen embryos.
Steven Kass, in contrast, wished to donate the embryos to the clinic storing
them. He relied on informed consent agreements between Maureen and him-
self which had been signed prior to the May IVF. The Kasses were divorced
in May 1994. The trial court found for Maureen. It gave her the right "to take
possession of the five zygotes ...for purposes of attempting conception."
The appellate court disagreed. It held the consent agreements to be
determinative. 5
10
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed. 511 It ruled that "agreements
between progenitors ... should generally be presumed valid and binding, and
504. Id. at 797.
505. Id. at 796.
506. Id.
507. See id.
508. Id. at 795.
509. 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
510. Id.
511. Id. at 182.
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enforced in any dispute between them."5 1 2 In particular, the Court concluded
that the consent agreements were not in fact marred by ambiguity. 513 The
Court almost entirely avoided discussing the issue of a constitutional right to




The discussion about how to deal with surrogacy contracts under U.S.
law is far from clear and continues to evolve. Several state courts have devel-
oped models for dealing with surrogacy cases. Three main approaches can be
distinguished: First, some courts, like the Massachusetts Supreme Court in
R.R. v. M.H.51 5 and the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Baby M, 5 16 try to
solve surrogacy problems by using traditional family concepts, although ac-
knowledging that these concepts have to be transferred into a new and differ-
ent legal environment. These courts use analogies to traditional family
concepts like the concept of adoption and its standard of the "best interest of
the child." However, it is unclear whether these concepts really fit the context
of new reproductive technologies and surrogacy. 5t 7 For example, there are
good reasons to prohibit payments beyond medical expenses in the adoption
context, but it is doubtful whether making it a crime to pay such money in the
surrogacy contract would be constitutional.51 8 Moreover, such an application
of the law would - for the majority of the cases - prevent gestational surro-
gacy, and would thus run afoul of the idea that surrogate gestation may actu-
ally be more desirable than existing adoption, foster parent, and stepparent
practices, since the rearing couple will also be the genetic parents.
519
Secondly, some courts, like the Californian courts in Johnson v. Cal-
vert520 and In re Marriage of Buzzanca,52 1 premise parentage predominantly
on the factor of choice and "intent" to raise the child. One has to admit that
intending parents in fact seem to be "especially suited to the parental role.
'522
512. Id. at 180.
513. See id. at 182.
514. Id.
515. See supra notes 57-58.
516. See supra note 444 at 107-07, 105-06.
517. See Cahn & Singer, supra note 19, at 160.
518. Doe v. Kelly, 100 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981), held that the Michigan
"baby-selling" statute could constitutionally be applied to a surrogate transaction in which a
married couple paid a surrogate to be inseminated, carry the child to term and relinquish it to the
couple at birth. However, the Kentucky Supreme Court has held that a similar surrogate agree-
ment does not violate the Kentucky statute against "baby selling." See Surrogate Parenting, Inc.
v. Com. Ex. Rel Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986); see also Harry D. Krause, Artificial
Conception: Legal Approaches, 19 Fam. L.Q. 185, 199-204 (1985); Robertson, supra note 11,
at 1012-1013.
519. Robertson, supra note 11, at 1013-1014.
520. See supra note 452, at 55-56.
521. See supra note 456.
522. See Dolgin, supra note 17, at 277.
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However, this approach is not applicable to all surrogacy contracts. The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals emphasized this point in In re Marriage Moschetta
when the Court explicitly refused to apply the Johnson intent-model to cases
involving not gestational, but traditional surrogacy agreements. It is unclear
whether the Buzzanca Court was really correct in broadening the holding of
Johnson that "natural" maternity can be predicated on intention by applying
this concept to a woman who bore no biological connection to the child in-
volved; no conclusive explanation was offered why consent should really be
treated as an equivalent to genetic motherhood. In addition, the question of
what standard to apply to parentage disputes involving only one biological
mother remained unsolved.523 In addition, the "intent" approach has to deal
with the fact that such intent may change, which in many cases will not be
obvious to some of the parties involved.
Finally, other courts, like the New York Court of Appeals in Kass v.
Kass 524 or the Tennessee Supreme Court in Davis v. Davis,525 emphasize the
contractual agreements into which the parties entered, and allow those agree-
ments to determine the relationships between family members. This approach
seems to have its merits by providing a familiar bright line rule as long as the
parties deal at arm's length. There is widespread concern, however, that bio-
logical parents, often occupying a higher socioeconomic status, will be able to
take advantage of poor, uneducated women in the surrogacy bargaining pro-
cess. 526 Commentators have expressed their concern that the unequal bargain-
ing power in such cases will lead to grossly one-sided contractual agreements
that favor the genetic parents and leaving the surrogate without (adequate)
protection. 527 Moreover, enforcing gestational surrogacy contracts has been
described as "to treat the body as a reproductive machine and the child as an
instrument to selfish ends."
528
Robertson has proposed to solve the contract enforcement problem by
distinguishing damages from specific performance as a remedy for the surro-
gate's breach of contract. 529 In his opinion, procreative liberty does require
that a contract is honored, but it does not require that it be enforced by specific
performance. Instead he argues that if a surrogate is not enjoined from abort-
ing, she can be ordered to pay damages to the couple for the loss they have
suffered. 530 This proposal does not adequately reflect that the interests of the
523. See id. at 253.
524. See supra note 472, at 299-14.
525. See supra note 221, at 265-267.
526. See Carl H. Coleman, Gestation, Intent and the Seed: Defining Motherhood in the Era
of Assisted Human Reproduction, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 497(1996).
527. Snyder, supra note 19, n.16.
528. Robertson, supra note 11, at 1014; see also GENA COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE
(1985).
529. Robertson, supra note 11, at 1015.
530. Id.
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couple who want to have a child are idealistic, and that awarding monetary
damages will fail to compensate for the loss of that child.
The controversy surrounding surrogacy is much too complex to be solved
in this thesis. The cases and their analysis have shown possible solutions and
their benefits and detriments. One commentator has already tried to show that
the different approaches represent a "continuum of responses" 531 which "read
as a group ...are harmonious and can be explained in terms of one broad
theory of familial relationships."
532
3. Comparison
The analysis of the American case law shows exactly why the German
legislature has chosen not to allow surrogacy contracts at all: surrogacy cases
consist of a complex fact pattern with multiple interests involved. A plain
contractual approach fails in those cases where the parties possess unequal
bargaining power. There are also ethical concerns about the use of the human
body as a "reproductive machine." If no specific statutory law exists, tradi-
tional concepts, in particular adoption concepts, have to be applied by analogy.
However, these concepts do not always fit the context of assisted reproductive
technologies. Furthermore, an intent/choice model seems critical at least in
those traditional surrogacy agreements where a "mother" has absolutely no
biological connection to the child.
Hence, by completely prohibiting surrogacy, the German legislature has
restricted both the power to enter into contractual agreements in general as
well as the right to procreate. This decision has a heavy impact, considering
that surrogate motherhood might be an ultimate possibility to bypass
sterility.53
3
In sum, the right to procreate cases, the right of informational self-deter-
mination and the right to know one's heritage, a reconciliation of both coun-
tries' approaches is not possible in regard to the right to enter into surrogacy
contracts.
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the concept of privacy and its
relation to new assisted reproductive technologies in Germany as well as in the
U.S. is still "marked by a fair degree of normative uncertainty. '534 Germany
and the United States both are highly developed, advanced industrial societies
coping with change and technological revolution, and both value individual
freedom in the context of a stable society. 535 They struggle to preserve tradi-
tional concepts of family and, at the same time, to respect the right of autono-
531. Dolgin, supra note 17, at 273.
532. Id. at 227.
533. See Harrer, supra note 11, at 122-23.
534. See Robertson, supra note 11, at 952.
535. Eberle, supra note 7, at 966.
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mous individuals to independently determine their lives and make their own
choices. 536  Such societies require time to evolve when faced with change, a
luxury that - unfortunately - is not permitted in the field of
biotechnology.
537
How, then, can the comparison between the two countries' laws help to
improve the situation? In general, "through study of other cultures, we learn,
by comparison, something important about ourselves. '538 "Perhaps this is the
central purpose of comparative law: We learn, by looking at others, important
truths about ourselves which can then be reevaluated or reaffirmed," and thus
"we discover alternative concepts of humanity, personality, and commu-
nity. '' 539 In other words, "By observing the problems associated with various
other responses, we may be able to avoid some of the same difficulties; like-
wise, the successes of other nations may provide a roadmap for our approach
.... Both understanding and insight may be gained from a comparative anal-
ysis."' 540 The process of learning is necessary to the profession because if
lawyers fail to become educated to the challenges and complexities of new
scientific and technological advances in the field of reproductive biology,
"they will increasingly lack understanding of the questions to be asked, let
alone answers to be given."'5
41
In particular, the analysis has shown that the right to privacy is not an
absolute right, but must be balanced with other societal concerns and the pri-
vacy rights of other people.542 This is no novel knowledge, but had already
been acknowledged by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis in 1890,
54 3
and has been confirmed by many courts and scholars since. 544 Thus, there is
still no alternative to determining the exact extent of the right by considering
the particular circumstances of individual and personal values on a case-by-
case basis.545 In this regard, I respectfully disagree with Radhika Rao who has
said that "new reproductive technologies ... raise issues too complex to be
decided according to constitutional principles that permanently balance basic
values, setting them into constitutional stone. ' 546 To the contrary, Germany's
536. Dolgin, supra note 17, at 272.
537. Pitrolo, supra note 8, at 205.
538. Eberle, supra note 7, at 966; see also THOMAS MANN, JOSEPH IN EGYPT (1938), trans-
lated in CURRIE, supra note 43, Dedication: "For only by making comparisons can we distin-
guish ourselves from others and discover who we are, in order to become all that we are meant
to be."
539. Eberle, supra note 7, at 1055.
540. Lorio, supra note 464, n.6 et seq; See id. at n. 130. However, any attempt of "wholesale
adoption" must be tempered.
541. Smith, supra note 19, at 52-53.
542. See Feiler, supra note 22, at 2446 and 2456 et seq.
543. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 214.
544. See, e.g., Rao, supra note 35, at 1106; Tushnet, supra note 2, at 1371 et seq.
545. Bergmann, supra note 91, at 502; Coleman, supra note 19, at 78; Eberle, supra note 7,
at 987.
546. Radhika Rao, Constitutional Misconceptions, 93 MicH. L. REV. 1473, 1495-96 (1995).
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concept of a "general right to personality," found in Articles 1 and 2 (1) of the
German Constitution and in Sec. 823 (1) Civil Code, and the American con-
cept of the right to privacy, based in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Consti-
tution and its Due Process Clause, are both open-ended.5 47
In addition, it has been pointed out that America might, on its way to the
development of a right of informational self-determination, make use of the
German approach as elaborated in the Census case.548 German law, correctly
defined, might also be helpful to the American legislature in adapting tort
remedies to an infertility context involving embryos and collaborators.5 49 On
the other hand, if dignitarian rights are justifiably viewed as indispensable to
German law, then the German Constitutional Court might profit from a trans-
plantation of certain techniques employed by the American Supreme Court to
preserve fundamental rights, for example the application of strict scrutiny.550
Such an importation has already occurred to some extent in the Right to Heri-
tage H case.551 It has been shown that a certain degree of difference between
both nations' approaches in respect to modem assisted reproductive technolo-
gies and the usefulness of the concept of a right to privacy in this area still
exists.552 It is also true to some extent that their views have converged some-
what. 553 For example, the German courts' recent decisions show that they
increasingly recognize that aspects of personality may have a commercial
value, and that these personalities are to some extent marketable. 554 The Ger-
man law has moved towards the American approach.
555
The fact that both nations' approaches come closer to each other can only
be welcomed. In the new millennium, where national borders have become
relinquished to some extent, it is preferable to come to an international consen-
sus, as no domestic solution would effectively be able to protect against the
"reproductive tourism." This concept is leading child-seeking couples to
travel from their homes to other nations that have more liberal approaches.5 5
6
This phenomenon is especially obvious in the European countries, 557 but is
equally true in the relation between the U.S. and Germany. An international
547. See Eberle, supra note 7, at 977.
548. See supra text accompanying notes 93-97.
549. Robertson, supra note 11, at 1036.
550. See Eberle, supra note 7, at 1056.
551. See supra note 72.
552. Eberle, supra note 7, at 1052 ("[Tlhe difference in constitutional doctrine may also be
because our private law, unlike German law, did not develop these concepts comprehensively,
and, thus, unlike German constitutional law, American law had no ready base to stand on.").
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consensus will not be easy to achieve. This is true because as with all interna-
tional treatises the problem is that different political, social, cultural and relig-
ious moral concepts collide,558 especially in the area of assisted reproductive
technologies. On the other hand, there are a number of international organiza-
tions, like the International Federation of Fertility Societies 55 9 or the Center
for Reproductive Law and Policy,560 which appear capable of enhancing the
approach for an international consensus. One possibility would be to draft
Uniform Acts561 or Restatements that provide guidance for the domestic ap-
proach. Such an approach has been taken by the international trade law sector
with the Principles of International Commercial Contracts, drafted and pub-
lished by the UNIDROIT (The Rome Institute) in 1994,562 or by the United
Nations' International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
563
Finally, the fact that some decisions of both the American and German
courts have been criticized should not be misunderstood as a statement that
they are useless. Progress is only possible by making mistakes. '564  In this
regard, even decisions that do not properly apply traditional concepts to new
technological challenges have merit because they trigger a discussion that then
leads the way to a more sound solution.
558. See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WEsTERN LAW 1, 8 (1987)
("Whether meant to or not, law, in addition to all the other things it does, tells stories about the
culture that helped to shape it and which in turn helps to shape: stories about who we are, where
we came from, and where we are going.").
559. See Lorio, supra note 464, n.16.
560. The Center for Reproductive Law and Policy (CRPL) is a non-profit legal and policy
advocacy organization dedicated to promoting women's reproductive rights. CRLP's domestic
and international programs engage in litigation, policy analysis, legal research, and public edu-
cation seeking to achieve women's equality in society and ensure that all women have access to
appropriate and freely chosen reproductive health services.
561. For the U.S. domestically, see Sec. 5 of the UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT, supra note 443.
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The Black Letter Text and a Review, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 281 (1994).
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